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Pakistan in 1957, is an autonomous research organisation devoted to carrying out theoretical 
and empirical research on development economics in general and on Pakistan-related 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over two fifths of our population appears to be poor in the sense that their basic 
needs are not met by the resources at their disposal. This level of pauperism is roughly 
similar if not higher to what was our experience to begin with, at the time of 
independence in 1947. During some periods of the Pakistan’s history of over five 
decades, poverty was brought under some control however. But numbers of poor today 
are more than the total population in 1947. Emergence of poverty and deprivation in a 
society or community in general has evoked a response in terms of provisions and 
transfers as well as modification in growth pursuits to improve the situation. These 
measures may take variety of forms in terms of institutional structures and organisations. 
Social Safety Nets (SSN) for instance currently are opted throughout the developing 
world including Pakistan to address the issues of poverty and deprivation. 
This study aims at examination of varying levels of poverty overtime and description 
and evaluation of existing social safety nets.  In the first section of this study a brief 
discussion of inter-temporal poverty profile is made.  The nature of SSN currently in vogue 
will be assessed in the second section of the report, wherein, their coverage, the contents and 
other qualitative dimensions will be described in detail. In addition, there will be a discussion 
of private philanthropy and transfers as well as their impact on the well-being of poor. In the 
concluding section SSN will be assessed with a major focus on highlighting the inadequacies 
of the existing approaches to alleviate poverty.  
 
I.  POVERTY LEVELS AND TRENDS IN PAKISTAN (1960–2003) 
Multidimensionality of poverty defies a neat demarcation. Often several but not 
separable meanings can be attributed to poverty which essentially should encompass 
totality of deprivation experienced by an individual or group of individuals. Encyclopedia 
of social sciences for instance suggests that definition of poverty is convention specific 
and distinguishes between Social Poverty and Pauperism. The former includes economic 
inequality or property incomes etc. in addition to social inequality such as dependence or 
exploitation while Pauperism denotes one’s inability to maintain at the level 
conventionally regarded as minimal. 
Pauperism has been the focus of researchers wherein efforts have been made to 
quantify the poverty, thus defined, using essentially arbitrary poverty lines or norms with 
application of varying procedures for estimation. Planning Commission of Pakistan 
recently suggested an official poverty line in terms of minimum caloric requirement per 
adult (2350 per day) and the needed expenditure of Rs  670 per person for 1998-99. This, 
however, is different than what has been used by other researchers. Arif (2002) for instance 
viewed that, despite a need to demonstrate the relevance of 2350 calorie intake used by 
official poverty line it can facilitate monitoring the poverty levels in the country in future. 
 2
During the past however poverty in Pakistan has been estimated using essentially 
two distinct procedures each having merit as well as demerits though both entail 
arbitrariness and variety of assumptions. In the first case the poverty estimates are 
based on poverty lines defined in terms of expenditure needed to attain a given level of 
calories per adult or per capita. Required expenditure has been estimated on the basis of 
regression of food and non-durable expenditure (sometimes total household 
expenditure) on calorie intake by households estimated on the basis of the quantities of 
different items consumed reported in the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(HIES), the only source used to estimate poverty. In some studies the expenditure 
required is estimated using the expenditure pattern of bottom three income groups. Non 
caloric needs such as housing, education, and health etc., arbitrary of course, are added 
using the ratio of food to non-food expenditure of poor or those just crossing the food 
poverty line. Obviously the poverty lines constructed using this procedure vary with the 
caloric intake needed, their conversion into expenditure and estimated non-food 
expenditure.  In contrast to this so-called revealed preference in the second case a 
normative approach following Ahmed (1993) wherein money value of bundle of 
commodities regarded as minimum acceptable level of living is used as a surrogate of 
poverty line. These include food, clothing, housing, health, education, transport, social 
interaction, and recreation facilities. 
Varying definitions and procedure used to estimate the poverty incidence have 
made it difficult to assess the situation at a point of time and exceedingly difficult to 
discern an inter-temporal trend. This is manifest from Table 1 where poverty estimates 
for 1984-99 period from three different sources are presented. Obviously the poverty 
levels for different years vary across these estimates but the time profile suggested by 
World Bank estimate using normative approach clearly takes exception to the other two 
estimates based on revealed preference. It hardly needs to be emphasised that the trend 
yielded by former estimate is inconsistent with other variable of relevance such as GDP 
growth rate, unemployment rate, and real wage trends. 
 
Table 1 
Poverty Estimates: Different Sources 
  Source  1984-85 1987-88 1990-91 1992-93 1993-94 1996-97 1998-99 
Urban 38.2 30.7 28.0 20.8 17.2 18.9 24.2 
Rural 49.3 40.2 36.9 27.7 33.4 27.3 35.9 
World Bank 
Overall 46.0 37.4 34.0 25.7 28.6 24.0 32.6 
Urban – 15.0 18.6 19.8 15.2 – 20.9 
Rural – 18.3 23.6 27.0 32.9 – 34.7 
Planning  
  Commission 
Overall – 17.3 22.1 24.9 27.7 – 30.8 
Urban – 15.0 18.6 15.5 – 27.0 26.0 
Rural – 18.3 23.6 23.3 – 32.0 34.8 
Independent  
  Researcher 
Overall – 17.3 22.1 22.4 – 31.0 32.6 
Source: World Bank: Poverty in Pakistan: Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps and Rural Dynamics, May 2002. 
Planning Commission: Pakistan Human Condition Report 2002. CRPRID. Independent 
Researcher: Amjad and Kemal (1997). Qureshi and Arif (2001). 
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Notwithstanding the above mentioned limitations poverty trends in Pakistan have 
been examined and analysed by various researchers. There is almost a consensus that in 
an historical perspective Pakistan was successful in reducing poverty over the decades since 
independence. Absolute poverty, Head Count Ratio based on caloric intake, declined from 
46.5 percent in 1969-70 to 17 percent in 1987-88.  Since then however the reversal has 
taken place.  Most recent research exercises are suggestive of a substantial rise in poverty 
incidence to 33 percent in 1998-99 and the worsening situation continued since then [Talat 
and Qureshi (2003)].  Incidence of poverty using basic needs approach also recount the 
same story, a rise from 29 percent in 1986-87 to 38 percent in 1998-99.  This deterioration 
during 1990s has been experienced both by rural as well as urban areas. 
Admittedly, overall economic growth has a direct bearing on poverty level in a 
country. However, Pakistan’s experience reflects a dissonance between these two.  For 
example, high growth period of 1960s is associated with a decline in poverty only in urban 
areas. In rural areas, the poverty situation worsened. During the next decade, GDP growth 
rate was lower than the previous one but level of poverty declined. During 1980s, one finds 
a straightforward and expected relationship between growth rate and poverty wherein the 
poverty improved while the economy registered a remarkable growth rate. 
A perusal of research studies conducted over the years reflects that in addition to 
growth there are some important determinants of poverty situation. For instance, high 
growth rate of 1960s failed to reflect any improvement in the poverty situation in rural areas 
because of the eviction of tenants and rise in landlessness [Irfan and Amjad (1984)].  In the 
wake of subdued economic performance of the early 1970s, a decline in the poverty level 
was made possible through escalation in the public sector employment and a massive rise in 
public sector expenditure [Zaidi (1999)]. Similarly, Middle East emigration and return flow 
of remittances had a very favourable impact on poverty situation in the country beginning 
late 1970s to middle of 1980s. A time period analysis of poverty level conducted by Amjad 
and Kemal (1997) highlights importance of remittances for the household poverty level.  In 
other words, Pakistan’s experience suggests a very close link between employment 
generation, remittances and tight labour market and poverty. 
The decade of 1990s unfurled a host of challenges and problems for the economy and 
society of Pakistan. These problems, such as budget deficit and disequilibrium in balance of 
payment were in the making for long time. The mismatch between revenue and expenditure 
worsened the situation, through accumulation of large stock of debt with insurmountable 
debt servicing liabilities overtime. Since 1977 for instance Public Debt in real terms grew at 
a rate much higher than real GDP growth. The built in rigidities and weaknesses of the 
system were exposed when efforts to address these issues were initiated under various 
IMF/World Bank Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Programmes since late 1980s. 
The slippage of the economy into debt trap in fact put a halt to the past practices 
wherein the entire development expenditure and occasionally the current expenditure used 
to be financed by internal and external borrowing. To the extent the improvement in poverty 
situation during 1970s and 1980s occurred because of the policies and measures resulting in 
huge budget deficits and mounting indebtedness, these represent inter-generational poverty 
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shift, wherein future generations have to pay back what was borrowed for sustaining as well 
as inflating the consumption level of current generation.  That borrowings from abroad 
were inconsequential for Pakistan’s GDP growth is a major conclusion of study by  
Kemal (2001).  Most of the endeavours like escalation in the public sector employment 
provided temporary relief in case of poverty alleviation which re-emerged with added 
complications in 1990s. 
In order to rectify the internal and external imbalances through curtailing expenditure, 
raising revenues and better export performance under IMF/World Bank reform packages, 
the economy was subjected to a discipline. Pakistan agreed to implement various structural 
adjustment and stabilisation programmes. It is in this context that various agreements 
beginning with 1987-88 were signed by the Government of Pakistan for implementation. 
With the exception of the latest SAP, there were implementation lapses though, Pakistan 
has been successful in attaining macroeconomic stability by implementing SAP and 9/11 
events and at the same time, experienced a massive upsurge in the foreign exchange 
reserves, currently being blown out of proportion as a distinct success of those at the 
helm of affairs. But the real side of the economy reflected a very sorry state of affairs, 
decline in the GDP growth rate, falling or stagnating level of investment, worsening 
unemployment situation and deteriorating poverty conditions during the 90s. Kemal 
(2003) identified the factors underlying the deterioration of the poverty conditions in the 
country in the context of Structural Adjustment Programmes and highlighted a number of 
factors explaining both subdued economic performance as well as worsening poverty 
situation in the country.  For instance, decline in the GDP growth rate has been attributed 
to low level of investment and lack of effective demand occasioned by the squeeze 
entailed by massive reduction in the public sector expenditure to address the problem of 
budget deficit. Furthermore the failure of the state to bring the rich into tax net rendered 
the taxation structure regressive wherein the poor were subjected to a disproportionate 
burden. Similarly, the withdrawal of input subsidies in agriculture sector along with 
provision of international prices to producers benefited only those who had marketed 
surplus in the agriculture sector which explains the failure of respectable growth in 
agriculture during 1990s to have a positive influence on the poverty in rural areas. The 
conjunctive influence of tariff rationalisation, financial sector reform and privatisation led 
to closure of factories and downsizing which in turn resulted into substantial job losses. It 
may be added that poverty-related expenditure of the government drastically reduced as a 
percentage of GDP during this decade, thereby crucifying the poor at the altar of macro 
stabilisation. The labour market outcome as indexed by rising unemployment rate and 
stagnant or declining real wages further compounded the situation. 
Whilst the above mode of analysis provides explanation for rise in poverty during 
1990s, there is also a need to disentangle the effect of structural adjustment from the 
inherent limitation of the overall dispensation of the country.  A case in point is that of 
failure of investment to rise, the basic factor which explains low growth. Of course this 
can be attributed to the inconsistency of the policies along with law and order situation 
but these can not be regarded as the off-shoot of the structural adjustment programme. 
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Similarly, massive reduction in public sector expenditure is more a failure of the state to 
generate resources because of the particular compositional specifics of the society than an 
effect of the transition of the economy under the structural adjustment.  Obviously, there 
is a need to mount more investigative pursuits with a view to understand the given 
constellation of the power brokers in the country and their impact on the poor, through 
the choices they make. 
Few if any research endeavour has been made to understand the power play and 
assess the sustainability of the interventions through critical scrutiny of their financing 
mechanism both in case of the macro or household level.  Most of the poverty estimates 
at the level of household exclusively focus on consumption expenditure with little 
investigation of the financing mechanism. This glossing over of survival strategy of the 
poor leads to equate those who have been out of poverty clutches at a point of time 
because of distress sale of their assets or through reckless borrowing resulting into high 
level of indebtedness, with those who have regular and permanent sources of income. 
This argument is equally valid for country level study too, because in general the 
sustainability of pro poor interventions has not been reckoned by researchers. 
 
II.  RESPONSES TO POVERTY—A BRIEF HISTORY 
Social concern for the poor appears to be as old as mankind itself. Sharing the 
hunger and poverty was observed to be a major characteristic of the traditional societies 
like Eskimos, and in sub-Saharan Africa [Herskovites (1940)]. In other parts of the world, 
this concern was reflected through variety of provisions and transfers wherein the rich 
segments of the society tried to share resources with the poor. The motives behind 
helping the poor by rich are not very clear and factors underlying this human behaviour 
defy simple interpretation. The transactions between rich and poor may be based on some 
exchange relationships entailing reciprocity to sustain a given structure or control 
mechanism. These transfers could also be due to much highlighted religion and cultural 
values. 
For instance, Amos much before Christ emphasised upon the rich to help the poor. 
It is well known that the Church in Europe established hospitals and poorhouses. Islam 
made it obligatory for the rich to pay Zakat and Ushr besides Sadaqat, (Charities), to help 
the poor. In fact a fixed proportion of wealth and agriculture produce has to be given to 
poor under Zakat and Ushr. This in fact represented the foremost effort in human history 
wherein Zakat/Ushr collection, establishment of Baitual Mal and elaborate procedures for 
distribution among poor was made by state.  With the demise of Caliphate system and 
emergence of kingdoms in Muslim world the obligatory payment of Zakat to poor was 
left to the individuals themselves and state ceased to collect and distribute these levies.  
In the embryonic phase, therefore, the social concern reflected itself at the non-state 
and at the level of communities and families with the exception of brief Caliphate period 
under Islam mentioned above. With the emergence of national state in Europe and 
elsewhere, a new social contract between individuals and the state evolved overtime. This 
was brought about by the changing nature of the economy, the ensuing settlement pattern 
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of population and related internal as well as external dynamics. Social protection as a 
matter of right was thus introduced in many countries in the West wherein the national 
state assumed major responsibility in this context. 
It appears instructive to highlight the factors which shifted the responsibility to 
alleviate poverty from family and communities to the national states. In England 
consequent upon dispossession of monasteries and break up of manors the state was 
forced to assume this responsibility. Famous “old poor law” of 1601 tended to accept in 
principle the responsibility of state to help the needy. A specific tax for poor relief was 
levied wherein different categories of need were also identified. However, till the onset of 
industrial revolution which brought variety of changes, major burden of the poverty 
alleviation was still borne by family and communities. 
Industrialisation and associated rural to urban migration weakened the structure 
composed of primary groups. Endurance of traditions wilted, thus the family was much 
less available for helping the aged. A new class of “able bodied poor” the ones largely 
excluded and incapacitated to participate in the productive process for supplementing 
their incomes, was generated by industrialisation. The enforced idleness in the context of 
labour supply outstripping the demand was rationalised by many though for a while.  The 
poor were characterised to be improvident wherein syllogism of economists was 
reinforced by theologians. This temporary retreat of state in England is visible in the 
“New Poor Law” of 1834 which sought to reduce the expenditure on the poor. English 
and American policy in fact adhered to this philosophy until the twentieth century. 
The effects of industrialisation on poor and unemployed were however addressed at 
state level in Germany primarily to combat the appeal of Marxian Socialism. Bismark 
instituted a system of national insurance in 1880. The Iron chancellor appropriated the 
ideas of economists like Adolf Wagner and Gustav Von Schmoller and applied the social 
insurance to whole of Germany. Well organised workers demanded for substantive 
reforms in England too. Historic surveys of Charles Booth and B.S. Rowntree’s study 
documented the massive prevalence of poverty in “the Workshop of the World”. The 
Royal Commission on Poor Laws and Relief of Distress set up under Beatrice Webb 
proposed the abolition of archaic poor laws to be substituted by a comprehensive 
programme of social insurance [Webb and Webb (1909)]. National Insurance Act of 
1911 was the first such legislative measure. The widely publicised Beverage report of 
1942 and National Insurance Act of 1946 were milestones on the way to provide 
insurance for all people in the UK from the “cradle to the grave”. 
The welfare state which essentially assumes legal and formal responsibility for 
basic well-being of its members was brought in existence by variety of co-terminus 
forces and factors such as industrial revolution, urbanisation, protests of worker’s 
organisation, and challenges of socialism. Currently it appears to be under stress in the 
West, because of ascendancy of market oriented development paradigm under 
globalisation since early 1980s and the demographic imbalances resulting in a high level 
of dependency of aging population. Furthermore the relegation of socialism to secondary 
importance as a contender or assumption of the role as successor further encourages the 
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proponents of unfettered capitalistic growth. These tendencies press for a modification if 
not total retreat from the welfare state. The extent to which democracies in the West can 
embrace the ideas such as “poverty is inescapable” and “poor are improvident” however 
remains a matter of speculation. 
 
Poverty Alleviation—Pakistan’s Approach 
Sufferings and miseries of those living in the colonies as subjects of the architects 
of welfare state in Europe were not addressed in similar fashion. Thus, in the Indian sub-
continent during occupancy of over hundred years hardly any measure resembling to 
Europe can be traced. Some sectoral legislation was resorted to for protection of 
employees in formal private and public sector. Similarly, health measures were mostly 
introduced to control epidemics. The limited educational services produced little just to 
man the offices of the Lords. 
Founding father of Pakistani nation always emphasised the importance of justice as 
a cardinal principle in Pakistan. “There are millions of our people who hardly get one 
meal a day. Is this civilisation? Do you visualise that millions have been exploited and 
can not get one meal a day. If this is the idea of Pakistan I would not have it” Quaid-i-
Azam in annual session of Muslim League in 1943 meeting clearly affirmed his pro-poor 
agenda [Tahir (1999)]. Needless to mention that successive regimes since independence 
could not live up to the expectations of the founding father. A renewed commitment was 
made in 1973 wherein social security as an explicit right of an individual was laid down 
in the Constitution under article 38 which reads as under: 
provide for all persons employed in the service of Pakistan or otherwise, social 
security by compulsory social insurance or other means; provide basic necessities 
of life such as food, clothing, housing, education and medical relief, for all such 
citizens, irrespective of sex, creed, caste, or race, as are permanently or 
temporarily unable to earn their livelihood on account of infirmity, sickness or 
unemployment; reduce disparity in the income and earnings of individuals. Article 
38 (d) and (e).Constitution of Pakistan. 
A closer scrutiny of the development policies pursued during the past five and a 
half decade since independence, hardly inspires confidence that an explicit pro-poor 
agenda was ever implemented despite such objectives being reflected in various policy 
documents and Five Year Plans. This tension between words and deeds could be 
attributed to various factors. Underdevelopment and lack of financial resources to opt for 
a generalised social security system, a characteristic of welfare state, could be the major 
one. Often pervasive family based enterprise system and self-employment have been 
identified as a surrogate of social protection as well as a hindrance in introducing one by 
the state.  A general perception that families, tribes and communities take care of the poor 
members was also used to justify limited initiatives by state. At the same time one fails to 
find a sustained mass movement of poor or labourers demanding exclusive pro-poor 
development strategy. This was presumably because of accommodative value system of 
the people, an interactive outcome of culture, religion and centuries old domination by 
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foreign powers, and tight grip of those at the helm of affairs. Finally it is also believed 
that the coalition of policy and decision-makers in Pakistan prefers to retain paternalism 
and dependency which explains their reluctance to introduce any measures which was 
right based such as, the social security. 
Various regimes have however devised programmes to alleviate poverty as a 
byproduct of rural development or employment creation. These were for instance rural 
development programmes such as—Village Aid in 1950, Rural Works Programme, 
People Works Programmes and other similar ventures. Construction of dams and 
irrigation networks, and provision of social services—education and health, etc. were also 
relied upon for addressing the poverty in Pakistan. Asset distribution through the land 
reforms was implemented twice but these reforms were not designed to introduce a 
radical departure from the erstwhile skewed distribution.  In addition to officialisation of 
Zakat, food rationing and provision of subsidies to consumers and small producers were 
also introduced occasionally.  Mostly, these measures were believed to be reflective of 
the visibility concern of various regimes with limited and short lived impact wherein 
poverty alleviation still remains a challenge as discussed in the previous section. A 
detailed discussion of various measures currently being undertaken to address problems 
of widespread poverty is presented in the following sub-section. 
 
Social Safety Nets in Pakistan 
A continuation of the efforts made in the past ostensibly to alleviate poverty in 
Pakistan is represented by the currently widely publicised social safety nets. These also 
reflect an international perspective too wherein states are assumed to be responsible in 
the developing world to address the casualties of economic growth under globalisation, 
the IMF and the World Bank Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment programmes. While 
the social safety nets in this sense are compensatory in nature, the policy-makers, 
planners, and the international organisations often use terminologies which lend a 
pretense of universal social protection or social security. In fact the approaches are 
widely different in coverage as well as dispensation. The universality and right-based 
nature of social security is totally missing under SSN. The origin of recently coined SSN 
can be traced to a deterioration of economic conditions in the developing world in the 
context of structural adjustment and globalisation [Cornia and Stewart (1988)]. 
Associated with the ascendancy of market oriented development paradigm, the state 
apparatus tended to weaken, hence growing disenchantment with its capacity to provide 
social services gave birth to certain new forms of SSN as well as provided space for new 
agents of development (NGOs) too. To some extent these imported (or imposed) models 
of social policy may be divorced from the political and social realities of the developing 
world. 
It is imperative to highlight the distinction between Social Security and Social 
Safety Nets, currently in vogue. The latter in essence often construed to act as a substitute 
of social security is in fact far from it. And is no more than euphemism for the social 
protection envisioned under universal social security system. The following basic 
elements characterise social security [Ginneken (1999)]. 
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 (a) People derive their rights from social security; 
 (b) Social security is provided through public or collective arrangements; 
 (c) Social security aims at protection, hence, promotion of employment and social 
services is not its major role; and 
 (d) Social security is not concerned exclusively with cash benefits but also with 
basic needs (medical care, education, housing and nutrition). 
Although the notions of Social Safety Nets keep on varying, however, the broadest 
use refers to all institutions and practices envisaged to prevent individual from remaining 
or falling below a specified minimum standard of living. SSN aim at: 
 (a) enabling the poor to better manage the risk; 
 (b) preventing poor from distress sale of their assets; 
 (c) a system of income insurance to help people through short term stress and 
calamities; and 
 (d) taking care of the long term disability. 
Obviously SSN in contrast to Social Security entail instrumentalism to achieve 
certain ends and unlike Social Security are not necessarily right based. SSN can be 
formal, the one legally guaranteed (though not right based) and informal. The latter do 
not carry any legal guarantee but can be provided both by public and private sector. 
 The current SSN in Pakistan like most of the developing countries are heavily 
skewed towards workers in the formal sector in urban areas. The bias can prevent a fair 
distribution of services and benefits to poor.  Given that Pakistan does not have an 
umbrella institution, a characteristic of generalised social security system, to cater to the 
needs of poor, the institutions providing SSN are: Government, Non-Government 
Organisations, Mosques, Financial Institutions, and Private Transfers. The SSN can be 
classified into five categories. 
 
(i)  Social Security Schemes for Workers (Formal Sector) 
 (1) Pension for Government Servants. 
 (2) Employees old age benefits schemes such as pension in the Formal Private 
Sector. 
 (3) Provincial social security benefits also include medical coverage, cash benefits 
and pensions, and other labour welfare measures for Formal Sector Worker. 
 
(ii)  Schemes to Finance Small Business and Micro Credit 
 (1) Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF). 
 (2) Khushali Bank. 
  
(iii)  The Transfers 
 (1) Zakat system to provide short term and long term relief to the poor. 
 (2) Provision of subsidised food and shelter to the vulnerable population.  
 (3) Private Transfers. 
 (9)
 10
(iv)  Public Works Programme for Employment Generation 
(v)  Education and Health Services 
 
In the above classificatory scheme measures falling under (i) designed for public 
and formal sector employees are backed by legal guarantee. Measures under (ii) 
essentially envisage to address the issues of the credit market imperfection wherein poor 
can not participate because of the inability to offer collateral. The extension of access to 
credit facilities to poor will result in social assistance only if the credit is provided at a 
subsidised rate of interest. However (ii) along with (iv) can also be regarded as 
facilitation and generation of employment which reflect an attempt to rectify the growth 
strategy for its failure to generate full employment. Provision of education and health 
services represent a constitutional obligation of the state and in principle can be regarded 
as poverty alleviation measures to the extent that these cover the poor and the latter in 
return also enjoy benefits from these. 
In the above package only old-age support under Pensions for public and formal 
sector employees provides income security and social protection. The remaining such as 
transfers can be characterised as social assistance with no legal guarantee. The SSN in 
Pakistan are generally not designed to provide income security or social protection to all 
the poor and destitute, though there are some elements of social assistance. All the above 
cited elements of SSN package are discussed below in detail. 
 
A.  Formal Sector Schemes 
 
Pension and Retirement Benefits (Old Age Support)  
Retirement benefits currently comprise of (i) Civil Servants Pension, General 
Provident Fund, and Benevolent Fund for Government Employees (ii) the Employees Old 
Age Benefit Institutions (EOBI) which offers subsistence pension benefits to private 
sector workers and (iii) Pension and Gratuity Schemes of Private Companies. These are 
discussed below. 
 
(i)  Pensions for Government Employees 
Permanently employed government servants of the federal or the provincial 
governments receive pension and other benefits under the laws of their respective 
governments, covered under the Government Servants Pension Funds Scheme. The 
government servants are entitled to receive pension and other benefits such as provident fund, 
on retirement, at the age of 60 or earlier after 25 years of pensionable service. Government 
servants who have worked for less than 25 years are not entitled to receive pension. Also the 
contract employees of the government are not entitled to any social benefits.  It is noteworthy 
that much of the new recruitment during the recent period in government is on contract 
though with better salary package than regular government employees.  It may be added that 
government pension scheme is unfunded and pensions constituted 30 percent of total salary 
in 1996 budget. Pensions are fixed according to the length of the service and because of non-
indexation of the pensions the inflation erodes their real content overtime. 
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(ii)  Other Private Sector Pension Plans 
Private sector pension plans are rare but there do exist a couple of hundred 
occupational plans, mostly promoted by multinationals. These are defined benefit plans 
funded by employers on the basis of actuarial recommendations. Contributions to these 
plans are tax deductible, subject to a maximum of 20 percent of salary earned by 
members. These plans promise benefits in the form of life annuities for the retiree and 
reduced contingent pensions for the spouse and minor children. The pensions accrue at 
the rate of 1 percent to 3 percent of basic pay for each completed year of covered service. 
Vesting is quite late, after 15 years of service and 50 years of age. Investment income of 
pension funds is exempt from income tax but not from zakat. Pensions and the 
commutations there upon are also exempt from tax and zakat. Besides being rare, these 
pensions are not portable, and annuity benefits of these pensions have been substituted by 
commutations which are quite common. 
 
(iii)  Employees’ Old Age Benefit Institution (EOBI) 
Most of the old age security and other welfare measures are managed and 
administered by Ministry of Labour under various schemes. Notwithstanding the fact that 
provision of labour welfare has been identified, to be a wise investment (Royal 
Commission on Labour 1931), precise definition of labour welfare remained elusive.  For 
instance, Labour Investigation Committee 1946 viewed labour welfare to be “over and 
above what is laid down by law and what is normally expected as the part of the 
contractual benefits for which workers may have bargained”.  Efforts spent at defining 
the labour welfare broadly suggest that the concept is flexible being specific to temporal, 
developmental and ideological contexts. 
Origin of the labour welfare work in the West can be traced to the nature of 
industrial system wherein conditions of work were regarded to be non-congenial for the 
health of the worker. Also it was felt that industrial atmosphere was strange to ruralite 
workers. These two factors often termed as “the long arm of the job and the “social 
invasion of factory” underscored the need for labour welfare measures. However, this 
focus on factory employment led to the exclusion of workers engaged in agriculture, 
informal sector and self-employed in general. Nearly all the worker welfare measure in 
Pakistan, administered by Ministry of Labour exclusively focus upon formal sector 
employees as discussed below. 
EOBI established under Employees Old-age Benefit Act, 1976 administers the only 
national pension scheme for employees in private sector industries/establishments with at 
least ten employees, excluding those in managerial and professional categories and 
directors. EOBI, a corporate body gets policy guidance from a Tripartite Board of 
Trustees, with Secretary Labour as its Chairman, four representatives from the Federal 
Government, four provincial Labour Secretaries, four provincial representatives of 
employers, and four provincial representatives of workers, and the Director General 
EOBI.  EOBI currently operates a head office, 9 zonal offices, 36 regional offices and 31 
field offices. These offices are engaged in the identification and registration of 
establishments and persons, collecting contributions, managing the Employees Old-age 
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Benefit Fund, and administering of benefits and settling related disputes and complaints. 
EOBI is authorised to invest the Funds which are not needed immediately and the 
resultant income of the Fund is exempt from income tax and zakat. 
According to the existing rules, employers pay mandatory contributions of 5 
percent of the first Rs  3,000 of employee’s wages per month. The government had been 
contributing an equivalent matching grant until July 1995, but it withdrew thereafter.  Old 
age pensions accrue at the rate of 2 percent of the final year wage (maximum of Rs 3,000 
p.m.), subject to a minimum of Rs 630 p.m. (recently increased to Rs 700 p.m). 
Survivor’s pension (for spouses on death after retirement and on death in service after 36 
months of coverage), invalidity pension, and old-age grants are also provided. These 
benefits are portable only between covered establishments. Normally workers become 
eligible to draw pension after reaching the age of 60 years (55 years for females) 
provided they complete 15 years as covered service. 
At the end of year 2000, the EOBI had 43,560 employers, 1,572,014 insured 
persons and 181,547 pensioners on its register.  EOBI, coverage is simply inadequate 
wherein only a minor fraction of total wage employees (estimated to be over 10 million) 
is covered. The number of beneficiaries is only a small proportion of the covered workers 
(10.4 percent), although this number is growing at a much faster rate (19.3 percent p.a) 
than the growth rate of the number of person entering the scheme (7.3 percent p.a) (see 
Table 2). This slow growth is due to employer’s evasion of paying contribution as well as 
low employment growth in formal sector. However, this generates a sustainability 
problem for EOBI because benefit outgo is higher than the increments in contribution. 
According to some estimates the Fund will start decreasing in next 20 years and get 
depleted in just a few more years under unchanging conditions. This un-sustainability has 
been pointed out by many actuarial assessments. 
 
Table 2 
Selected EOBI Data 
    Registration 
End 
2000 
End 
1999 
End 
1998 
End 
1997 Growth 
Employers (No.) 43560 42632 – – 2.2% 
Insured Persons (No.) 1572014 1465087 – – 7.3% 
Beneficiaries (No.) 181547 164203 – – 10.6% 
Pensions Disbursed (Billion Rs) 6.6 5.53 – – 19.3% 
Beneficiaries as % of Total Coverage 10.4% 10.1% – – – 
Contributions (Million) 1534 1421 1337 1276 6.3% 
Administrative Expenditure (Million 
Rs) 
318 228.16 211.53 187.36 19.3% 
Admn. Exp./Total Income (%) 4.9 3.5 3.8 3.9 – 
Admn. Exp./Ann Contributions (%) 20.7 16.1 15.8 14.7 – 
Source: Ministry of Labour. 
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Sharp growth in EOBI’s administrative expenditures is quite noticeable. These 
expenditures (4.9 percent of total receipts and 20.7 percent of contributions in 2000) are 
much higher than similar institutions in other countries, and are growing rapidly (19.3 
percent) p.m. in 1997–2000. These high establishment costs would exert a downward 
pressure on the benefit level. The system is managed poorly and reportedly suffers from 
several governance and administrative problems. Procedures for monitoring of payments, 
filing of returns and assessment, and resolution of disputes are cumbersome. There are 
numerous complaints from employers and employees against harassment at the hands of 
the EOBI staff. Records are alleged to be poorly maintained and there is a lot of evasion 
and manipulation. Recent scam of Rs 1 billion is still shrouded in the mystery. 
Finally pensions are not indexed and erode quickly due to inflation. The 
government has at times attempted to partially relieve this hardship by raising the 
minimum pension. But this relief has not been enough and even the minimum pensions 
have lost one-thirds of their value in last 15 years.  The erosion produces unpredictable 
effect on pensions, creates inequities between different age cohorts, and diminishes the 
effectiveness of the plan. 
 
(iv)  Employees’ Social Security (ESS) 
Under the Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance 1965, the ESS operates 
with applicability to commercial, industrial and other establishments employing 10 or 
more workers. The social security institutions collect contributions from employers @7 
percent of the wages of those employees whose wages are upto Rs 5000 per month. A 
worker is defined as secured under the Ordinance if the employer contributes to the social 
security institutions.  Secured persons are entitled to benefits as laid down in sections 35-
44 of the said Ordinance.  These include comprehensive medical care and hospitalisation 
for employees and their dependents too.  In addition secured persons are also entitled to 
employment injury benefits, maternity benefits, death grants and partial disablement 
pensions as well as survivor’s pensions. 
The social security schemes are administered by Provincial Social Security 
institutions in different provinces through tripartite governing bodies comprising 
representatives of employees, workers and government. The coverage of these 
institutions is provided below in the Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Coverage of Social Security Institutions and Facilities—1999-2000 
 
Industrial/Commercial 
Units 
Registered 
Workers Dispensaries Hospitals 
Sindh 12700 198000 37 4 
Punjab 26299 524000 127 8 
NWFP 2301 234015 17 2 
Balochistan 194 7234 4 N.A 
Source: Ministry of Labour. 
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Needless to mention that registered workers account for insignificant fraction of 
wage employees in urban areas.  Actual dispensation of the medical facilities and health 
services to the secured workers can not be assessed because of the limited information. 
However, data pertaining to the expenditure per secured person appears to be a paltry 
sum while on the other hand the administrative expenditures appear disproportionate and 
on the higher side.  The relevant data are reproduced in the Table 4 below for different 
provinces. 
 
Table 4 
Per Capita Administrative and Total Expenditure on Secured Persons 
(Rupees) 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan  
Per 
Capita 
Admn. 
Exp. 
Per 
Capita 
Exp. on 
Secured 
Person 
Per 
Capita 
Admn. 
Exp. 
Per 
Capita 
Exp. on 
Secured 
Person 
Per 
Capita 
Admn. 
Exp. 
Per 
Capita 
Exp. on 
Secured 
Person 
Per 
Capita 
Admn. 
Exp. 
Per 
Capita 
Exp. on 
Secured 
Person 
1996-97 52231 917 73803 1246 51096 1203 55453 1740 
1997-98 60780 1130 80080 1374 65302 1256 65095 1899 
1998-99 61848 1407 81866 1463 64934 1400 66569 2339 
Source: Report of the Task Force on Labour Welfare Levies. Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, 
Islamabad. May 2000. 
 
In fact administrative expenditure has risen during 1996-99. For instance the ratio 
of administrative expenditure to total receipt rose from 18.8 percent in 1996-97 to 19.4 
percent in 1998-99 in Punjab. The information on other provinces reflects similar trends. 
The Task Force on Labour Welfare Levies headed by Justice (Rtd.) Mohammad Afzal 
Lone for instance viewed that “The figures disclose a marked difference between the 
administrative expenditure and the expenditure incurred on the “Secured Persons” which 
reflects that the objection of employers is not entirely ill-conceived and rather it tends to 
support their allegation that these Institutions are existing more for the benefit of the 
administrative set up rather than to promote the well being of the labour force who are the 
real beneficiaries identified by the legislature”. 
 
(v)  Workers’ Profit Participation Scheme 
In response to massive labour protests and strikes during late 1960s against the 
declining real wages and deteriorating living conditions, the Government enacted 
Companies Profit Participation Act 1968 wherein workers (drawing salary less than Rs 
3000) were entitled to participate in the profit of establishment. The Act was applicable to 
the companies having (i) 50 or more workers in their employment (ii) paid up capital of Rs 
2.00 million or more and (iii) fixed assets of value of Rs 4.00 million. It was also laid down 
that every establishment/company falling under the purview of the act would establish a 
Workers Participation Fund to be managed by Board of Trustees (comprising of two 
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persons elected by workers). A sum equivalent to 5 percent of the profit has to be 
earmarked to the fund annually, which was to be distributed among the eligible workers. 
The leftover amount was to be transferred to Workers Welfare Fund by the AGPR. 
 
(vi)  The Workers Welfare Fund (WWF) 
The workers welfare fund was established in 1971 through an Ordinance. Its main 
purpose was to finance projects connected with the establishment of housing estates or 
construction of houses for workers; and finance other measures for the welfare of 
workers. It is financed through a 2 percent levy on taxable income of employers whose 
taxable income in a year is Rs 100,000 or more, (the levy last year brought an income of 
Rs 1 billion to the WWF). The second and even more important source of income of the 
Fund is the surplus amount from the op cited Workers Participation Fund; which 
amounted to Rs 2 billion in the year 2000. 
The Fund has an accumulated amount of close to Rs 6 billion in investment and 
over Rs 11 billion lying with the Finance Ministry. It may be noted that the Workers 
Welfare Fund is collected by the CBR and a large amount of resources are lying with the 
Federal government and the Fund does not receive any benefit or interest on that amount. 
The receipts of WWF (2 percent of the levy and left over amount under Workers Profit 
Participation Scheme) in the first instance forms part of Federal Consolidated Fund 
subsequently these are transferred to Reserve Funds of WWF by debiting to the budget 
Grant of Ministry of Labour. The actual collection of WWF and actual releases for the 
1994-99 period are reported below in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Actual Collection and Releases of WWF 
(Rs Million) 
 
Actual Collections 
Budgeted Release to 
WWF 
Actual Release to 
WWF 
1994-95 957.8 650 650 
1995-96 1234.9 650 650 
1996-97 1531.9 650 – 
1997-98 1711.3 650 – 
1998-99 2458.5 650 423 
Source: Ministry of Labour. 
 
The above table reflects that release to WWF has been only 21 percent of the actual 
collection and 41 percent of the budget provision. The fund is collected federally but 
most of the operations are undertaken by the Provincial Workers Welfare Board 
(WWBs). These Boards are run by the officials of the provincial governments with little 
control for monitoring by the WWF. Total expenditure made by WWF on welfare and 
other related activities in different provinces and at headquarter during 1971-99 period is 
shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6 
WWF Expenditure 
(Rs Million) 
(i) WW Board Punjab 1612.6 
(ii) WW Board Sindh 2089.9 
(iii) WW Board NWFP 1285.6 
(iv) WW Board Balochistan 1469.1 
(v) Headquarter 682.0 
Source: Report of the Task Force on Labour Welfare Levies. Finance Division, Government of Pakistan, 
May 2000. 
 
At the federal level, the Fund is theoretically run by a tri-partite governing body, but in 
practice the Federal government controls it. The Fund has, therefore, in general, not been 
administered according to its mandate; successive governments have used it for outlandish 
projects such as the Kidney Centres etc.  The structural problems such as the relationship 
between the Fund and the Boards have led to widespread misuse and misappropriation of 
funds on the one hand and an extremely inefficient allocation of resources, especially in the 
housing sector on the other. This has been substantiated by investigation and subsequent 
prosecution of the officials of the Boards in the NWFP and Balochistan by NAB. Similar 
inquiries are being conducted in the affairs of the other Boards as well. 
Quite apart from the problems listed above, the overall performance of the Fund in 
its major area of activity, the housing sector, has been totally unsatisfactory. For example 
in its 30 years of operations only 11577 houses (578 units/years), and 4749 flats (237 
units/years), have been built. It has over the same period developed 35175 plots 
(1758/year). And only 44860 workers or 1.1 percent of those employed in the 
manufacturing and mining sectors have benefited from the three decade long endeavors. 
There are serious complaints as to the manner in which the houses/flats and plots have 
been allotted. There are also questions about the eligibility of the beneficiaries in most cases. 
In the area of “other welfare measures” as well, the Fund seems to have been wandering into 
all kinds of activities, most of which are regarded to be dubious and many duplicating the 
functions of other institutions such as the ESSIs, Mine Workers Welfare, etc.  
 
(vii)  Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Scheme, 1967 
Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act 1967, a Federal enactment with 
Provincial implementation regulates welfare of mine workers. It may be noted that the 
Mines Act 1923 guarantees the provision of health, safety and maintenance of shelter for 
workers to rest and a canteen. Under the Act of 1967 collection of a levy on all minerals 
at rates not less than Rs 1 and not more than Rs 5 per ton as specified by the Government 
are collected. The information on collections and receipts during 1996-99 for different 
provinces is reported below in Table 7, which also reports in parenthesis administrative 
expenditure of inspectorate of Mines for the said period. 
The table is reflective of a very high ratio of administrative expenditure to receipts, 
ranging from 8.8 percent in NWFP to 70 percent in Balochistan. Information pertaining 
to the welfare oriented work and number of beneficiaries is available only for Punjab 
Province for 1998-99 as reproduced below in Table 8. 
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Table 7 
Receipts of Excise Duty on Minerals by Provinces 
(Rs Million) 
  Year Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
1996-97 9.31 
(4.40) 
Around 
17.00 
3.76 
(0.37) 
6.25 
(2.49) 
1997-98 7.63 
(4.06) 
– 
 
4.70 
(0.375) 
4.13 
(2.80) 
1998-99 13.41 
(4.07) 
– 4.79 
(4.2) 
3.76 
(2.64) 
Addition Exp. (30.3%) – (8.8%) (70.2%) 
Source: Report of the Task Force. 
 
Table 8 
Beneficiaries 1998-99, Punjab 
(i) Students on Roll 1670 
(ii) Patient Treated 48566 
(iii) Scholarship to Miner’s Children 356 
(iv) Beneficiaries of Housing Schemes 180 
Source: Report of the Task Force. 
 
Independent evaluation of the transparency and manner of dispersal of these 
benefits to workers is lacking, though there are allegations of misuse and non-
transparency. 
 
(viii) The Workers’ Children Education Ordinance, 1972 
This scheme meant for providing free education to worker’s children was conceived 
as a provincial scheme to be financed through a levy at the rate of 100 rupees per annum 
per worker on industrial establishment. A separate establishment has been created by 
each province to administer this scheme. The collection of levy is undertaken by ESSIs 
on behalf of this scheme. Only 12000 students in two Provinces of Punjab and NWFP 
benefited while the total collection in these two provinces amounted to Rs 9 Million. 
Information pertaining to provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan is not available. 
 
(ix)  Compulsory Group Insurance Scheme, 1968 
This scheme under the standing order 10-B of the West Pakistan (industrial and 
commercial employment) Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, obliges all employers to 
insure all permanent employees against natural death, disability and injury arising out of 
contingencies not covered by the Workman Compensation Act, 1923, or the Employees 
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Social Security Ordinance, 1965. The premium fixed by the insurance companies is 
usually very high as compared to the amount disbursed to the workers, or their heirs.  The 
employers therefore, usually avoid. Given that the Ordinance does not apply to 
establishments with less than 20 workers, and the fact that today most workers are not 
employed as permanent workers, a vast majority of workers are not covered by this 
scheme. The social security institutions also provide these benefits while of late the 
WWF is also providing death grants. The scheme under the circumstances is left with 
very little scope and perhaps with little validity.  
 
B.  Micro Credit 
Improved access to credit facilities has always been recognised as a measure 
leading to higher incomes of the poor and small operators in the farm as well as non-farm 
sector. In Pakistan during the past variety of initiatives have been undertaken, which 
ranged from extending the out-reach of banking system to specialised credit schemes 
such as Peoples Finance Corporation in early 1970s, Small Business Finance Corporation 
and Youth Investment Promotion Scheme in 1980s. The extent to which poor benefited 
from these ventures largely remains undocumented. The above mentioned credit 
extension measures are alleged to benefit non-poor more than the poor particularly 
wherever subsidy was involved because of the rent seeking behaviour of the 
functionaries, as well as requirement of collateral, which the poor cannot offer. It appears 
that the reliance of poor on expensive sources of credit provided through informal lenders 
did not curtail substantially.  Some studies suggested that share of institutional credit in 
overall credit has declined since 1985, and the role of informal credit was predominant, 
accounting for over three fourths of the total [Irfan (1999)]. 
During the 1990s the Government added to the pre-existing facilities such as 
Agricultural Development Bank, First Women Bank, and National Rural Support 
Programme.  The new initiatives under, Khushali Bank and Pakistan Poverty Alleviation 
Fund (PPAF) were undertaken. Similarly a special facility for SME sector was put in 
place.  Below a brief discussion of Khushali Bank and PPAF is made. 
 
(i)  Khushali Bank 
Khushali Bank currently operating in over 80 districts was established in August 
2000. So far around Rs 0.3 billion have been disbursed to 30 thousand applicants with 
female share being one-third in the beneficiaries. The Bank is planning to enhance the 
coverage to 100000 households annually as well as the operations will be targeted to 
poor. Recently opening up of Micro-Finance Bank in the private sector is being allowed 
with simplified procedures for licensing and supervision. 
 
(ii)  Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund 
PPAF was established to extend the access of poor and micro enterprises to credit 
facilities. The World Bank provided a loan of US $ 90 million and an equivalent amount 
of grant, the former for disbursement as a credit and the latter for infrastructure buildup 
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of PPAF and related organisations. The PPAF was established as a joint stock company 
outside the Governmental influence, presumably to avoid its discretionary powers. The 
Board of Directors of PPAF which provides policy guidelines, comprises of three 
members from the government and the remaining nine from the civil society. 
PPAF acts as wholesaler and distributes credit through the sister organisations 
(NGOs). While the provision of credit to poor without any subsidy (often reflected 
through lower interest rates) is understandable, the appropriation of spread between the 
borrowing rate (at 2 percent) and ultimate lending rate (20-22 percent) hardly appears to 
be justifiable. Who is the beneficiary in the totality of transaction? Do the functionaries 
of PPAF and sister organisation enjoy this reward simply for organising CBOs in the 
villages? 
The above constitutes a major design problem. The objective of arranging a social 
collateral through CBO could have been achieved at much lower cost through 
cooperative credit societies under the administrative control of the Provincial 
governments. The spread would have been used to build up their reserve fund, which in 
turn would have ensured sustainability to the venture, currently missing under PPAF. 
In addition to the above mentioned design problems the coverage of PPAF is 
currently limited. Also allegations of application of social pressure and harsh measures 
for the recovery of loans have been made too. Furthermore hardly is there any evaluative 
study which could indicate the extent to which the poor have benefited from PPAF as 
well as making it difficult to assess targeting efficiency.  PPAF was established because 
of the encouraging experience of micro-enterprises loan of the World Bank distributed 
through Banker’s Equity Limited wherein loan was extended to successful ongoing 
enterprises. The extent to which PPAF can achieve such a primacy is difficult to 
determine.  
 
C.  Transfers to the Poor 
Under transfer to poor there are three main elements.  Zakat and Pakistan Baitul 
Mal is administered by State, while private transfers from rich to poor do take place too. 
These are discussed below. 
 
(i)  Zakat 
Payment of Zakat and Ushr is obligatory upon rich and constitutes as one of the five 
fundamental tenets of Islam. In the initial periods of Muslim history the government used 
to collect Zakat/Ushr to be deposited in Baitul Mal for assistance of the poor and 
destitute. With the emergence of kingdoms in Muslim World this practice was stopped 
and payment of Zakat/Ushr was left to individuals themselves to help the poor and needy. 
In Pakistan, President of Pakistan, on June 20th, 1980, promulgated the Zakat and Ushr 
Ordinance. However in contradistinction to religious injunctions where Zakat has to be 
paid at the rate of 2.5 percent of all the wealth over and above NISAB (the minimal 
amount of property liable to the payment of Zakat), under this Ordinance it was levied on 
only interest bearing financial wealth.  Thus, Zakat is deducted by the financial 
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institutions on the following assets: saving bank accounts, fixed deposits saving 
certificates, NIT units, ICP’s mutual fund, certificates, government securities on which 
return is paid, annuities and life insurance policies and provident fund credit balances. 
Five tier administrative set up was put in place for Zakat administration: Central 
Zakat Council, Provincial Zakat Council, District Zakat Committees, Tehsil Zakat 
Committees, and Local Zakat Committees.  Provincial and Tehsil Zakat Committees 
were abolished and 12 regional administrators were appointed in 1996.  Until 2001, more 
than 30,000 Local Zakat Committees were working in the country with the help of more 
than 250,000 employed workers and volunteers. In 2001, all the Zakat committees were 
dissolved through a Presidential Order, on the charges of politicisation and financial 
mismanagement of the system. Under the new setup, about 40,000 new Zakat committees 
were constituted after the clearance by the Army Monitoring Team. 
The financial institutions do not charge fee for the collection service.  After keeping 
a percentage of all proceeds for national welfare and other schemes, the State Bank of 
Pakistan transfers the Zakat funds to Zakat committees for distribution.  These 
committees can spend up to 10 percent of allocated funds on administration. These Local 
Zakat Committees spend 60 percent of the Zakat funds for distribution among poor for 
subsistence and rehabilitation of deserving persons. The remaining 40 percent is 
distributed through institutions like deeni madaris, public hospitals, vocational training 
institutions and other welfare institutions.  
Zakat collection increased over time from Rs 846 million in 1980-81 to Rs 4276 
million in year 2000-01. But as a percent of gross domestic product Zakat was around 
0.31 percent in 1980-81 which declined to 0.204 percent during 1990s and in the 2000-01 
it was only 0.14 percent of GDP (see Appendix Table 1).  Initially, Zakat was distributed 
at the rate of Rs 300 per month to Mustahaqin (eligibles).  Upto Rs 7000 p.a was paid to 
an eligible student for higher education and upto Rs 5000 for Jahez (dowery). However, 
under the revised system, the subsistence grant increased from monthly transfer of Rs 300 
to Rs 500.   All payments are made through banks to improve transparency. 
By the end of December 2001, Zakat system according to official records benefited 
2 million people and about 0.5 million of them received assistance on a regular basis. 
Previously Zakat system emphasised on grants and stipends. The revitalised system seeks 
to provide funds to Mustahaqin not only to fulfill basic needs but also to permanently 
rehabilitate them, by helping them in the establishment of small-scale business or other 
means of living suitable to them to achieve self-reliance. 
The extent to which officialisation of Zakat collection and distribution represents an 
additionality in the totality of transfers from rich to poor is difficult to determine. In case 
of Pakistan Cox and Eser (1995) viewed that private transfers are sensitive to pre-transfer 
income of the recipient, hence an increase in the public transfer may reduce the levels of 
private transfers. Identification of eligible beneficiary by Local Zakat Committee 
reportedly involves favouritism and misgovernance. This is manifest from the wholesale 
changes and the dismissal of all Zakat Committees through a Presidential Order in 2001. 
The new Zakat committees simply with the clearance of Army Monitoring Team hardly 
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qualify to be more honest than the previous ones replaced unless some supporting 
evidence, missing in this case, is provided. 
On the level and magnitude of transfers generally official data are reported. HIES 
does provide information on receipt and payment of Zakat by households. HIES 1998-99 
data suggested that only 1.2 percent of the households in the country reported receiving 
Zakat.  This fraction was higher in the case of bottom income groups than in the middle 
or top. For instance 9.9 percent of the households in the lowest income group (Rs 1–
1000) reported to be receiving Zakat in contrast to 0.3 percent for the top (Rs 7000 and 
over). Admittedly these calculations need to be improved using the ranking of households 
on the basis of per capita income or expenditure to assess the targeting efficiency. 
However a crude exercise using monthly household income data reported below alludes 
to the possibilities of improvement in targeting the transfers to the poor. Table 9 below 
reflects that the top three income groups (with monthly household income of Rs 5001 and 
above) account for 22 percent of the Zakat recipient households and 19 percent of the 
total Zakat received. This clearly suggests substantial mistargetting. 
 
Table 9 
Recipient Household + Zakat Received 1998-99 
 
Income Groups 
Recipient Household 
(%) 
Zakat Received 
(%) 
(a) Bottom 3 54.5 53.6 
(b) Middle 4 23.5 27.1 
(c) Top 3 22.0 19.3 
  100.00 100.00 
Source: HIES 1998-99. 
 
It may be noted that a World Bank study found that only 29 percent of the direct 
transfers through Zakat were made to the bottom expenditure groups in 1996-97.  These 
calculations simply are indicative of the extent to which targeting can be improved. 
 
(ii)  Pakistan Baitul Mal 
Pakistan Baitul Mal (here-in-after PBM) was established, as a corporate body in 
1992.  The main purpose of PBM is to work for the welfare of widows, orphans 
disabled, needy and poor people irrespective of sex, caste, creed or religion. PBM is 
managed by a chairman, five non-official members (appointed by Federal 
Government), and by three official members. Federal government is the main source of 
funding. The funding dropped from Rs 1 billion in 1996-97 to Rs 0.2 billion in 1998-
99. PBM also receives small grants from the Zakat funds as well as from provincial and 
local governments. The PBM with little funds at its disposal is thinly spread over 
number of activities.  These are: 
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 (1) PBM provides individual financial assistance to poor persons with monthly 
household income of less than Rs 1500.  
 (2) The programmes for the provision of food included, World Food Programme’s 
food support programme where PBM helped for distribution of food among 
needy. In 1998, Rs 89 million were spent on distribution of food.  In addition to 
programme for food, provisions are made for health and education and 
remission of House Building Finance Corporation’s loans to the widows.  
 (3) The programme for education and training included the rehabilitation of the 
parents of these school going children. Under the programme, the parents are 
asked to propose/select any small scale business or work and a loan of Rs 5000 
is provided for this purpose. Open Tech Scheme was started as joint venture 
with Allama Iqbal University for vocational training of child workers, working 
as apprentice in auto workshops. For this purpose, 175 workshops are selected. 
After the training the children are provided a tool box to earn a living on their 
own.  
 (4) National Centre for Rehabilitation of Child Labour opened 33 schools for 3 
million working children (17 schools are in process).  Stipend of Rs 150 p.m. to 
each child and Rs 300 to parents was given to compensate for loss of child’s 
income. Similarly, National Commission for Child Welfare was established to 
deal with the issue of child labour. 
 (5) Mobile Dispensaries are started to provide medical help in the katchi abadies. 
So far these dispensaries are working only in provincial capitals.  
However, despite wide variety of coverage of activities, the number of beneficiaries 
of PBM programmes is quite small. For example, the number of beneficiaries was only 
230865 households in 1999, which is negligible considering the extent of poverty. 
Furthermore, there may be overlap of Zakat recipients and PBM beneficiaries. This will 
reduce the coverage and effectiveness of the programme further. Since government is 
main source of funding, the programme is sensitive to changes in the fiscal conditions. 
Funding to PBM declined from Rs 1 billion in 1996-97 to Rs 0.2 billion in 1998-99. In 
addition, the alleged lack of transparency and corruption in the use of funds may have 
reduced the effectiveness of these programmes. 
 
(iii)  Private Transfers—Philanthropy 
Generally it is believed that private charity is deep-rooted in Pakistan owing to 
cultural and religious reasons. Few research attempts have been made to check the 
veracity of this belief which have provided some insights into the magnitude and pattern 
of indigenous philanthropy. A study quoted in Rimmer (2000) investigated formal and 
informal social safety nets using 10 locations in urban as well as rural areas. According to 
the authors, employers and well off neighbours demonstrate their generosity by giving 
cash and in-kind charities to poor at the occasion of Eid and Ramadan. That private 
charity is not only ad hoc, depending on free will of giver but it does not capacitate the 
poor for permanent extrication out of poverty. In addition, private charity, according to 
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authors, also involves strings such as to repay in term of labour, loyalty or commitment to 
support a particular political party. The recipient of charity characterised it as a 
disempowering experience.  
A study sponsored by Aga Khan Development Network (2000), reflects a massive 
amount as individual giving or charity as reproduced below in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 
Estimates of Total Giving by Individuals in 1998 
(Rs Billion)  
Given to: 
      Forms of Giving Organisations Individuals Total 
A.  “Monetary” Giving (1+2) 15.144 25.972 41.116 
       1.  Money (1.1 + 1.2) 10.353 19.444 29.797 
            1.1 Non-Zakat 9.369 6.647 16.016 
            1.2 Zakat 0.984 12.797 13.781 
       2.  Gifts-in-kind 4.791 6.528 11.319 
B.  Value of Time Volunteered 17.233 12.189 29.422 
      Hours of Time Volunteered 0.919 0.650 1.569 
Total Giving (A + B) 32.377 38.161 70.538 
Source:  Arshad Zaman Associates (1999) The Dimensions of Individual Giving  in Pakistan. A Study for 
Aga Khan Foundation (Pakistan). 
 
According to this study, around Rs 41 billions of donations (cash/kind) and Rs 29 
billions worth of time has been donated under private philanthropy by individuals. Two-
thirds of monetary donations represent inter-individual transfers, while remainder is 
donated to organisations.  This reflects a general lack of awareness as well as of trust of 
the social institutions. The extent to which charity as inter-individual transaction, as 
discussed above, yields certain benefits to donors such as subservience and serfdom of 
recipients, was not explored by this study. 
On the basis of this survey however, certain tall claims, such as the private charity 
being higher than the government expenditure on social sector development and that 
indigenous grants are almost five times that of foreign resources, have been made.  As 
usual Pakistani authorities rushed to establish a new institution, Pakistan Centre for 
Philanthropy, to tap the potentials hinted at by the above mentioned study. The extent to 
which claims made in the study have been exaggerated cannot be quantified. It may be 
added that the report suggests that around one-thirds of the transfers occur among the 
poor themselves. 
HIES 1998-99 (the year of the above cited study) suggests that around 11 percent of 
the households reported receipt of gifts. Overall average value of the gift among the 
recipient households for the year works out to Rs  4168.00.  In other words a total of Rs  
8 or 9 billion have been received by individuals as gifts. Nearly 47 percent of these gifts 
were given to top three monthly income groups. This underscores the need to launch a 
 (23)
 24
survey on statistically sound footing to estimate the totality of individual philanthropy for 
provision of a solid base to prevailing euphoria. 
In fact some of the observers are of the opinion that creeping cash economy over the 
years has substantially weakened the level and mode of individual charity.  Some of the goods 
such as vegetables, fruits, wheat, milk, etc. which were given free to poor in the rural areas in 
the past are being sold now in the market. The effects of monetisation and commercialisation 
on the individual and collective philanthropy in Pakistan have not been examined.  In addition 
in majority of the cases the so called philanthropy entails reciprocity hence it entrenches the 
divide as well as sustains the very apparatus which has generated poverty.  
 
D.  Public Works Programme for Employment Generation 
Pakistan has a long history of introducing public works programmes with different 
nomenclatures in different periods as provided in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 
Public Works/Rural Development Programmes 
Name of Programme Duration Description 
Village AID 1953-1962 Village workers aimed to mobilise communities and act as 
extension agents for government departments; 
Surplus labour in villages used to enhance rural infrastructure: 
schools, clinics, water supply; 
Each village worker served 7 villages; plan was to cover most 
villages by 1965. 
Rural Works 
Programme (RWP) 
1962-1971 Financed through US PL-480 food grants; 
Employment Programme for Infrastructure; 
Unlike Village AID, did not require any contribution from 
community; 
Urban programme included under 3rd Plan but did not get off 
the ground. 
Integrated Rural 
Development 
Programme (IRDP) 
1972-1980 Aimed to support small and medium farmers; 
Sought to improve rural production and incomes through 
establishing service centres to serve communities. 
Peoples’ Works 
Programme (PWP) 
1972-1982 Amalgam of old RWP with an added urban component; 
Government funded employment programme for  
non-farm work. 
Five Point Programme 
(FPP) 
1985-1988 Rural component covered education, health, road, 
electrification, water supply and sanitation; also 7 marla plots 
scheme and special development programme. 
Taameer-e-Waten 
Programme (renamed 
in 1993 as Peoples 
Programme 
1991-1999 Senators and MNAs identify development schemes in their 
constituencies; 
Objective to provide basic amenities like rural roads, 
sanitation, drinking water. 
Source: Rimmer (2000). 
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It may be noted that right from V-AID to current Khushal Pakistan Programme the 
interventions were made to achieve the objectives of poverty alleviation through rural 
development and consequent direct employment generation, though of short duration, 
depending upon the length of construction phase. Indirect employment generation of the 
increased construction activity can be sizeable, however. 
Nearly all the programmes with the exception of V-AID have been politicised 
essentially though the involvement of Union Council, MNAs, MPAs etc. In 1962 Rural 
Works Programme started outside Five Years Plan and was handed over to Basic 
Democrats. This tradition of involving local politicians was kept alive thereafter wherein 
politicians wielded their influence in site selection and channeling benefits in terms of 
jobs and contracts to their clients in the constituency. In the mix of activities generally 
new construction has been preferred over the maintenance, simply because of the 
visibility as well as hefty kickbacks. 
Community participation in the context of lord/serf relationships is simply a hoax. 
In more egalitarian setting it has generated dividends and ensured efficient use of 
resource. Only under Village Aid the community was supposed to contribute towards 
programme/project. Impact of these programmes on employment generation and in turn 
on poverty alleviation has never been systematically estimated. Generally guestimates 
have been offered, precisely like the current governmental practice. 
 
(i)   Khushal Pakistan Programme (KPP) 
KPP is under implementation since 1999 and over 13000 small projects have been 
approved out of which 10000 have been completed. Under this programme, farm to 
market roads, water supply schemes and small rural roads have been constructed. The 
budget allocation for FY 2001-02 was Rs 7.5 billion, which increased after the events of 
September 2001. The official estimate is that around 500000 jobs of various durations 
would be created. This claim is not based on sound evidence or exercise. In principle 
communities are empowered to participate in various phases of the project ranging from 
identification to implementation, but the manner and level of community participation is 
not very well documented. 
Expectations of improvement in implementation and better governance under 
Devolution through District Councils appear to be optimistic because of two major 
factors. Firstly in a district, tehsil or union council the feudalistic mode of dispensation 
will not wither away by sub-division of geographic area. Second and most important 
stumbling block are the claims of MNAs and MPAs for having a major say in the 
distribution of these funds.  In the ensuing tussle the District Councils can be rendered 
ineffective. While the importance of public works programme for provision of 
infrastructure, employment generation and poverty alleviation cannot be denied, the 
challenge remains in the effective use of resources and overall better governance. 
 
E.  Social Services 
Pakistan’s failure to translate improved growth into human development over the 
years has been highlighted by many research studies [Ranis and Stewart (1997)]. A low 
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level of public expenditure, weak delivery system and sub-optimal utilisation of resources 
have been identified as major factors underlying the poor performance of social sectors and 
thereby human development which not only is often regarded as an important input for the 
overall developmental ventures of the nation but also for poverty alleviation. Cross-
sectional surveys very often yield a positive association between poverty and illiteracy. 
Similarly better health is supposed to enable one enjoying higher productivity than a sick or 
ill person, as implied by efficiency wage hypothesis. More important is the intrinsic value 
of the education, health etc. than the instrumental.  Citizens are entitled to have education 
and health as a matter of right, hence these need to be treated as merit goods.  
 
Social Action Programme 
Government of Pakistan with funding and collaboration of international donors 
initiated a Social Action Programme (SAP) in 1992 to improve the human development 
indicators. In principle a cross-sectoral initiative, in actual implementation was sectoral 
under SAPP-1 and SAPP-2.  SAP focused upon four major areas—primary education, 
basic health care, drinking water supply and rural sanitation and population welfare. 
Execution of the programme was entrusted to Planning and Development Ministry at the 
Federal level whereas SAP secretariats at the provincial levels were established for 
implementation. 
The first phase of SAP was completed at a cost of Rs 106.4 billion with two thirds 
being spent on education. The overall performance, as discussed below, was frustrating in 
case of education and limited in other sectors.  Still the Government launched SAPP-2 for 
five years 1997–2002 with an estimated cost of Rs  498 billion.  A brief description of the 
achievements under these programmes is made below. 
 
(i)  Education 
A perusal of Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS), officially considered to 
be a monitoring device for performance under SAP for various years, fails to yield any 
improvement in primary enrolment rates, both net as well as gross (see Appendix Table 
1). Not only are the achievements insignificant but lie way below the targets. For instance 
Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of 72 percent in primary in 2001-021 was substantially 
lower than the target of 88 percent set by SAP for 1998-99. Similarly primary NER was 
42 percent in 2001-02 which in fact declined from 46 in 1991. The failure of SAP took its 
toll in the shape of worsening inequalities among rich and poor and rural vs. urban areas, 
though the gender gap appears to have been narrowed essentially because of larger 
decline in the male NER at primary level. A perusal of intertemporal data (PIHS) reflects 
that declining participation of poor, and low income groups during the 1990s account for 
the overall decline in NER & GER. 
The stark differentials by income quintiles yielded by PIHS 2001-02 are reproduced 
below in Table 12. 
                                                 
1The PIHS report 2001-02 presents adjusted and unadjusted data. Due to non-availability of adjusted 
data for the previous years in this section unadjusted data for 2001-02 are reported. 
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Table 12 
Net Primary Enrolment (Excluding Katchi), by Income Group 
Net Primary Level Enrolment Rate (%) – 2001-02 PIHS 
Urban Areas Rural Areas 
 
Male Female Both Male Female Both 
Pakistan 57 54 56 43 33 38 
1st Quintile 38 29 34 31 22 27 
2nd Quintile 51 45 48 39 30 35 
3rd Quintile 57 48 52 47 34 41 
4th Quintile 61 64 62 52 40 46 
5th Quintile 72 73 72 59 58 56 
Source: PIHS, Published Report 2001-02 (unadjusted data). 
Notes: 1. Quintiles: Quintiles are based on per capita consumption expenditure of 14,679 households and 
estimates are based on these quintiles may slightly be different, in some cases, from those based 
on the total sample of 14.820 households.  
 2. The 1st quintile contains individuals with the lowest consumption level, whereas the 5th 
quintile contains individuals with the highest consumption level. 
 3. Net enrolment rate: [Number of children aged 5-9 years attending primary level (classes 1-5) 
divided by number of children aged 5-9 years] multiplied by 100. 
 
The table indicates that NER for the first quintile is almost half of what is reported 
for the top income group, both in rural as well as urban areas. Rural/urban differentials 
appear substantial across all the income groups. Male/female differentials are striking 
among lower income groups which wither away in case of top income group in urban 
areas and substantially narrow down in case of rural areas, indicating an unholy alliance 
between poverty and gender disparity. Inter-provincial differential in Primary NER for 
2001-02 reproduced below suggests that the rates range between 39 for Balochistan to 58 
for Punjab, in case of male. In case of female NER in Punjab is above average while the 
remaining three provinces lie substantially below average with Balochistan being at the 
bottom with NER of 24 compared to 53 for Punjab (see Table 13). 
The differentials by income level and rural/urban are visible in drop out rates too. 
For instance drop out rate for the cohort of 15-19 years was reported to be 39.9 for first 
quintile and 8 for fifth quintile in urban areas in 2001-02. In case of rural areas these rates 
were reported to be 53.4 and 23.0 respectively. It may be added that dropout rate which 
signifies the efficiency in the resource use experienced overall only a modest 
improvement during 1990s. 
The foregoing is reflective of the failure of SAP to enlist the participation of low 
income households as well as rural areas, its major focus. Hence one can question the 
characterisation of SAP as a poverty alleviation programme.  It may be added that overall 
allocation to SAP rose from 1.8 percent of GDP in 1992-93 to 2.1 percent in 1996-97 but 
subsequently declined to 1.59 percent in 1998-99. Since the temporal profile of  
enrolment rates suggests a rise during 1992-96 with decline afterwards, the niggardly 
performance can be partly attributed to this financing gap.   However, this cannot account  
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Table 13 
Net Enrolment Rate at the Primary Level, by Province (Including Katchi Class) 
Net Primary Level Enrolment Rate (%)1998-99 PIHS  
Male Female Both 
Overall 53 44 49 
Punjab 58 53 56 
Sindh 45 34 46 
NWFP 55 38 46 
Balochistan 39 24 32 
Notes: 1. Net enrolment rate: [Number of children aged 4-9 years attending primary level (classes 0-5) 
divided by number of children aged 4-9 years] multiplied by 100. Enrolment in katchi is 
included. 
 2. Numerator of NER: Raised sum of all individuals aged 4 -9 years who report currently attending 
primary level, including katchi class. 
 3. Denominator of NER: Raised sum of all individuals aged 4-9 years who responded to the 
relevant questions. 
 
for the entire story. Various research studies identified obstacles both in the demand 
and supply side of education. The factors underlying the political decision-making and 
management can be held responsible for sub-optimal and misuse of resources such as 
improper site selection, and absenteeism of teachers etc.  It may be noted that during 
the second phase of SAP, Third Party Validation (TPV) of recruitment, procurement 
site selection and absenteeism was introduced. The findings of TPV undertaken in 
1998, 1999 and 2000 fail to reflect any improvement except somewhat in case of the 
site selection. 
The demand side of education appears to have been glossed over by the designer of 
SAP.  First of all it is costly to send a child to primary school. In government schools on 
the average Rs 821 per year are spent per student at primary level according to PIHS 
2001-02.  Thus 40 percent of the boys and 26 percent of the girls who never attended 
schools reported the reason to be too expensive in 2001-02 PIHS.  In addition there are 
other costs too, such as contribution of child in domestic work and household enterprise 
which must be sacrificed by getting a child enrolled in school.  Furthermore the economic 
benefits from education hardly appear obvious in the context of massive unemployment 
particularly for poor and under privileged.  In the job market both influence and links are 
important and poor do not have either one.  Failure to reckon with the parental constraints 
and motivation resulted in their lower level of participation. 
Low quality and absenteeism of teachers along with inadequate instructional 
material (a supply side factor) also tends to bear upon the enrolment. In urban areas there 
has been substantial shift away from government schools particularly among the middle 
and upper income groups. PIHS 2001-02 for instance reveals that only 27 percent of the 
primary school students belonging to top income group (5th Quintile) are in government 
schools in urban areas. The corresponding percentage for 1st Quintile households in 
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urban areas is 75 percent.  While emergence of private schools has been identified and 
very often celebrated as a productive public-private partnership, some aspects seemingly 
have been neglected.  Not only does the quality of education in private school vary but 
the participation is income level specific.  Furthermore with the exit of rich and 
influential from the government schools there will be little pressure, if any, on the 
government to improve the situation in public sector institutions.  In addition through the 
prevailing education system rich poor divide is likely to be accentuated.  
 
(ii)  Health and Population Welfare 
SAP envisaged to improve the quality and access to basic primary health care 
services. Preventative care, control of communicable diseases, maternal and child 
health/reproductive care were emphasised by SAP. Infrastructural provisions such as 
Basic Health Units (BHU) and Rural Health Centres were set up in rural areas.  However, 
most of these outlets reportedly were under-funded and understaffed. The impact of SAP 
on major indicators (outcomes as well as process indicators) related to health are 
discussed below: 
 
Infant Mortality 
Infant mortality improved from 122 in 1991 to 82 in 2001-02. However, Oxford 
Policy Management (OPM) mid-term review of SAP casts doubt on the data related to 
the base year 1991, which according to OPM is an overestimate hence the pace at which 
infant mortality declined during 1990 is slower than suggested by PIHS data.  Also 
according to some studies the rate of decline in infant mortality during this decade was in 
fact lower than that in 1980. Irrespective of the correct rate, the 2001-02 level of infant 
mortality (82) is substantially higher than India (70) and Bangladesh (61).  It needs to be 
pointed out that SAP failed to achieve the target of 65.  Large differentials in this respect 
between rural and urban areas are noticeable. Inter-household variations in a given area 
appear to be substantial and often have been attributed by researcher to mother’s level of 
education. 
Application of care is consulted while interpreting the data yielded by HIES which 
relies on maternity history and refers to data on births three years prior to survey.  Thus 
PIHS 2001-02 reported infant mortality rate is based on the cohort of children born 
between January 1995 and December 1997.  Memory lapses leading to under-
enumeration or over-reporting of births can generate implausible results.  For instance in 
1998-99 the male infant mortality rate for Balochistan is lower than Punjab and Sindh. 
However, the ranking gets reversed in 1996-97 PIHS.  
 
Incidence of Diarrhea 
Diarrhea, a leading cause of infant deaths and a major disease, appears to have been 
brought under some control. Its incidence (during the 30 days preceding the survey) has 
declined from 25 percent in 1991 to 12 percent in 2001-02.  Administration of ORS, an 
inexpensive treatment for Diarrhea, remains however quite low.  Over 63 percent of the 
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children with Diarrhea resorted to private practitioners according to 2001-02 PIHS, while 
only 20 percent of the patients are reported to have used government facilities. 
 
Immunisation 
One of the major objectives of SAP was to expand immunisation with a target of 
universal coverage by the end of 1990s. The available data suggest that by the end of the 
decade the coverage was around 50 percent which was almost twice of what obtained in 
1991, though the progress in the coverage of immunisation appears to have been 
stagnated after 1997.  It may be noted that the fraction of those children regarded to be 
fully immunised varies across income groups as well as provinces. The evidence on the 
former by sex is reproduced below from PIHS 1998-99. 
 
Table 14 
Percentage of Children Aged 12-23 Months who Have been  
Fully Immunised, by Income Group 
1998-99 PIHS 
Urban Areas Rural Areas Both Areas Province and 
Income Group Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female Both 
Pakistan          
1st Quintile 31 26 28 23 27 25 23 26 24 
2nd Quintile 54 28 42 27 28 28 30 29 29 
3rd Quintile 43 33 38 32 18 25 37 22 30 
4th Quintile 65 58 62 31 29 30 35 31 33 
5th Quintile 84 68 76 32 32 32 51 49 50 
Notes: PIHS Published Report. 
 1. Quintiles: Income group made on the basis of per capita household consumption.  
 2. Children who reported having received full immunisation who also have an immunisation card, expressed a 
percentage of all children aged 12-23 months. 
 3. Immunisation: To be classed as fully immunised a child must have received: ‘BCG’, ‘DPT1’, ‘DPT2’, 
‘DPT3’ ‘PLIO1’, ‘POLIO2’, ‘POLIO3’, and ‘Measles’. 
 4. Quintiles are based on per capita consumption expenditure of 14.679 households and estimates are based on 
these quintiles may slightly be different, in some cases, from those based on the total sample of 14,820 
household. 
 
The above Table 14 is indicative of stark differentials (of 1 to 3) by income group 
in urban areas. These get narrowed down in rural areas where overall level of full 
immunisation is substantially lower than urban areas. 
 
Pre- and Post-natal Care 
A perusal of the 2001-02 PIHS is indicative of low level of pre-natal medical 
consultation. Only 35 percent females resorted to pre-natal consultation. Wide disparity 
among rural (26 percent) and urban (63 percent) was noticed. One finds substantial variation 
in medical consultation by household’s income/expenditure levels. Low income and poverty 
appears to be a major detractor in this respect. Overwhelming proportion of deliveries among 
the low income and poor households has been at home wherein nearly 40 percent of births 
were not attended by any trained personnel.  Rural/urban and income specific differentials 
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exist in this case too. Post-natal consultations reportedly are very low (9 percent).  In general 
rural/urban and poor/non-poor divide bears upon the levels of consultations. 
 
Access to Health Facilities 
PIHS 1998-99 reveals that around 32 percent of PSUs are equipped with a 
government facility. This percentage rises to 69 percent if one also includes availability 
of private practitioners and health workers. Provincial differentials do exist wherein 
Balochistan and rural Sindh appear to be lagging. Within a given region availability of 
health facilities tends to be influenced by the affluence and wealth status of the 
community wherein villages with majority of population being poor are ill equipped in 
this context. 
Using PIHS data a World Bank study attempted at assessing the impact of 
availability of health facilities on health indicator. This is reproduced in Table 15 below: 
 
Table 15 
Access to Health Facilities and Selected Health Indicators (1998-99) 
Any Hospital, 
Dispensary or Clinic 
Any Health Facilities 
or Worker 
Selected Health Indicators In PSU Not in PSU In PSU Not in PSU 
Infant Mortality per 1000 80.9 93.3 83.2 99.4 
     Male 83.9 93.4 87.1 95.0 
     Female 77.8 93.1 79.0 103.8 
Child Mortality per 1000 104.5 117.0 104.0 129.5 
      Male 110.7 115.3 113.3 113.6 
      Female 98.1 118.8 94.0 145.9 
Incidence of Pre-natal  
   Consultation (%) 25.7 19.6 26.0 13.7 
% of Births Unassisted by Trained 
   Personnel 42.4 48.3 42.9 52.2 
Source: World Bank (2002) Pakistan Poverty Assessment: Poverty in Pakistan—Vulnerabilities, Social 
Gaps and Rural Dynamics. The World Bank, Islamabad. (Report No. 24296-Pak.) 
 
As reflected by the above table some health indicators appear to have improved 
with availability of the facility.  This result can be a mere coincidence because neither the 
quality of the health facilities nor its use by surrounding population is controlled in the 
above comparison by World Bank researchers. However, the findings do reveal an 
important aspect of the overall dispensation wherein the rich and influential communities 
get disproportionate share while the poor are jettisoned. 
 
(iii)  Population Welfare 
Reduction in fertility is a major goal of SAP, which was to be achieved through 
expansion in family planning services with a targeted coverage of 70 percent in rural 
areas and 100 percent in urban areas. Although there exists a concurrence of investigative 
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studies that fertility has declined during the 1990s the precise magnitude and timing of 
the onset of decline remains controversial. Surveys conducted in 1997 yield estimates of 
TFR for mid 1990s ranging between 5.3 (PFFPS) to 5.9 (PIHS). Unfortunately PIHS is 
regarded to be of limited value assessing TFR as well as Contraceptive Prevalence Rate 
(CPR). 
More reliable estimates based on PDHS, PCPS and PFFPS are indicative of a rise in 
CPR during the decade of 1990s. As reported in Table 16 below, CPR has risen from 
11.8 percent in 1990-91 to 27.6 percent in 2000-01. However, the use of modern method 
is still as low as 20 percent in 2000-01. 
Irrespective of the imprecision surrounding the exact quantification of the decline in 
T.F.R. some studies allude to the changes in nuptiality pattern as a major contributor in 
this respect. Table 15 below reproduced from a study by Soomro (2000) presents 
contributions of various proximate determinants in the fertility decline during 1975-97 
period. 
 
Table16 
Percentage of Currently Married Women who are Currently Using  
Specific Contraceptive Methods, by Various Sources 
    Method 
PCPS 
1984-85 
PDHS 
1990-91 
PCPS 
1994-95 
PFFPS 
1996-97 
PRHFPS 
2000-01 
Any Method 9.1 11.8 17.8 23.9 27.6 
Any Modern Method 7.6 9.0 12.6 16.9 20.2 
Any Traditional Method 1.5 2.8 5.2 7.0 7.4 
Source: Pakistan Human Condition Report 2002 CRPRID, Islamabad.  
 
Table 17 
Contribution of Proximate Determinants in Reduction of Births  
Per Woman in Pakistan:  1975-1996 
PFS-75 DHS-91 PFFPS-97 
  Proximate 
Determinants 
Index Absolute 
Change 
in TF 
Relative 
Change 
Index Absolute 
Change 
in TF 
Relative 
Change 
Index Absolute 
Change 
in TF 
Relative 
Change 
Non-marriages 0.788 2.421 29.524 0.682 3.60 39.56 0.678 3.471 37.976 
Lactational 
Infecundibility 0.593 5.311 64.768 0.625 4.42 48.57 0.677 3.484 38.118 
Contraception 0.955 0.468 5.707 0.891 1.08 11.87 0.783 2.185 23.906 
Total (TF-TFR) 8.2 8.2 100.00 9.1 9.1 100.00 9.14 9.14 100.00 
Source:   Soomro (2000). 
 
The above Table 17 suggests that while relative share of the contraception in 
decomposition exercise has risen during the period under review from 5.7 percent in 1975 
to 23.9 percent in 1997, its level however is still lower than the other two proximate 
determinants in 1997. A rise in the relative share of non-marriages during the same 
period has been attributed by the author to worsening economic conditions during 1990s 
which led to postponement and delay of marriages.  Not only is there a need to 
investigate further in this respect but the impact of Family Planning on fertility needs to 
be assessed carefully. 
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(iv)  Rural Water Supply and Sanitation 
Improving the performance of the local systems, expanding access to safe drinking 
water and to ensure sustainability through promoting community responsibility 
particularly for operation and maintenance of water supply schemes were major 
objectives of SAP. Water supply provision was carried out by Department of Local 
Government and Rural Development (LGRD) while Public Health Engineering 
Department (PHED) were involved in schemes based on piped system. 
A perusal of PIHS data suggests that percentage of households having access to 
clean water in rural areas experienced a modest increase from 74 percent in 1990-91 to 
80 percent in 2001-02. It must be noted that various sources such as tap, hand pump, 
and motorised pumps proxy the access to clean drinking water. The quality of water 
from these sources is not assessed in PIHS.  It may be noted that changes introduced in 
the PIHS questionnaire to improve data collection on safe and clean water during 
different rounds complicate the interpretation of the data. Availability of toilets in rural 
areas registered a limited rise from 32 percent in 1990-91 to 40 percent in 2001-02. 
Household access to drainage system, either underground or covered appears to have 
remained stagnant or declined during 1990s.  The above is suggestive of a limited 
impact of SAP, if any, on the availability of clean water and improvement in sanitation 
facilities. 
 
III.  SOCIAL SAFETY NETS—AN ASSESSMENT 
Evaluation of the social safety nets with respect to their totality of the impact on the 
poor, the society and the economy is admittedly a complex task because of pervasive 
ramifications.  However, the SSN have generally been examined and evaluated with a 
particular focus on their implications for the poverty stricken segment of the society.  
Keeping this orientation in view, the SSN evaluation has often been made on the basis of  
 (a) coverage; 
 (b) targeting efficiency; 
 (c) access; 
 (d) incentive effects; 
 (e) income equivalence of the transfers; and 
 (f) the cost effectiveness of the delivery mechanism. 
In the foregoing section, formal sector SSN such as pensions, social security and 
welfare measures implemented by the governmental departments particularly, Ministry 
of Labour, have been discussed separately from the measures like SAP, Zakat, Micro-
finance and credit as well as infrastructural development programmes under Public 
Works for employment creation. In the following, this classification is retained to 
assess the relevance of these interventions for poverty alleviation. In addition, the 
question of sustainability of programmes as well as the problems in their design will be 
discussed.  
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A.  Old Age Pensions, Social Security, and Welfare 
Programmes in the Formal Sector 
The Ministry of Labour implements a number of programmes ranging from old age 
pension to provision of housing and education of workers’ children as discussed in detail 
in the previous section.  It appears imperative to highlight the fact that most of these 
programmes and interventions have followed the announcement of 1969 labour policy 
wherein, the government has explicitly recognised for the first time “that the workers had 
not had a fair deal in the past in a period of growing prosperity and rapidly increasing 
production the workers’ real income and living conditions have remained static and in 
many cases have deteriorated”.  It may be added that the 1969 labour policy essentially 
was a response to the massive unrest and protests of the labour movements in late 60s. 
Thus one finds an emergence of a number of measures such as EOBI, Workers Welfare 
Fund (WWF) and other related interventions as discussed earlier.  Most of the measures 
suffer from various limitations in addition to the problems of design, management, 
governance and inadequacy of the coverage as discussed below. 
 
(i)  The Design Problem 
Nearly all the interventions and measures envisaged to provide social 
security/protection to the workers are funded by the employers, though ultimate impact is 
borne by workers in the shape of lower wages. Non-visibility of contribution by the 
workers has rendered the entire system as a charity based, affording limited sense of 
participation of workers towards their own benefits.  This is also associated with number 
of other related problems. For instance, there is no provision for the preservation or 
transfer of pension rights on termination of employment. Thus, in the privatisation 
process, since the workers’ do not contribute to the pension fund, there is no basis for the 
payment of the lump sum as a substitute of pension right. In the wake of closure of 
unprofitable public sector industrial units, payments have been defaulted by employers. 
Hence problems have occurred for the beneficiaries in receiving these benefits. 
There appears to be a discrepancy between the intent of the labour policy and the 
subsequent introduction of certain measures such as under WWF.  For instance, the 
policy seems to be categorical in its intent to “construct low cost housing and other 
facilities for workers” as a supplement to “the previous government’s policy regarding 
the provision of housing by employers”.  The Workers’ Welfare Ordinance in its actual 
implementation has failed to follow the spirit of the labour policy which was not to 
undertake construction activity aimed at providing self-owned shelter to the workers but 
to cater for his housing needs during his working life with a particular employer at a 
particular station. In other words, through the implementation of Workers’ Welfare 
Ordinance 1991, the employers were no more regarded to be responsible for providing 
houses to the workers. This can be regarded akin to providing subsidy to employers. 
Identification of the beneficiaries is also a complicated issue in the design. While 
the Workers Welfare Ordinance opts the definition of “worker” from the Industrial 
Relations Ordinance, in actual implementation there is no procedure laid down to 
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maintain this exclusiveness. Similarly insertion of “other benefits” alongwith house 
construction in the WWF Ordinance proved to be too elastic.  In actual implementation 
activities ranging from distribution of cycles to establishment of Kidney centres were 
undertaken, mostly for political dividends as well as constituency buildup.  
 
(ii)  Management and Governance Issues 
The Workers Welfare Ordinance 1971 and rules made in 1976 are imprecise and 
vague with respect to authority and procedures of (a) identification of welfare measures 
and benefits for the workers; and (b) control of funds collected.  In actual practice, it has 
been an exclusive prerogative of the government to suggest and undertake measures such 
as housing and others.  Interestingly, in 1982, through a Presidential Order, construction 
of houses was stopped but again revived in 1988 by the Cabinet as if the factors 
underlying the previous decisions were not relevant anymore. Similarly, Kidney Centres 
were established using workers money under the directives of the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan and a massive funding went into these ventures which were presumably 
populous in nature and in the process also led to the built up of the respective 
constituencies of the decision-makers, both the political as well as bureaucratic. 
Imprecision and vagueness of the rules were exploited by those who were at the helm of 
affairs to identify the benefit as well as beneficiary using the free will as if the funds were 
just like a bounty.  At times one feels that the Ministry of Labour has taken upon itself to 
provide everything under the sun ranging from education, health, housing, old age 
security, etc. with total neglect to duplication in the system as well as cost effectiveness 
and governance.  On top of it all benefits to eligible workers were reported to be little if 
any. 
 
Management 
It may be added that all the institutions under the Ministry are managed by a 
governing body with Minister or Secretary as Chairman and comprising of members from 
the government, the workers and the employers—the highly celebrated tripartite 
mechanism.  In actual dispensation, the governing body approach for the administration 
of these organisations and measures proved totally ineffective and weak. It rubber 
stamped the decisions made by the Ministers or other higher level authorities.  One of the 
reasons for this ineffectiveness was that mostly the selected individuals were hand picked 
and irrespective of their level of representation were nominated by the Ministry as 
members of the governing body. Thus the whole mode of dispensation not only permitted 
but also facilitated the buildup of respective constituencies in addition to rent seeking.  
There are dozens of cases lying with National Accountability Bureau.  Some of the 
politicians and officials have been convicted and more recently, the scam of Rs  One 
billion in EOBI reflects the level of honesty and governance applied in the actual 
administration of these institutions. 
Interestingly enough, the Ministry itself started examining the functioning of 
various schemes. Thus, in 1985, a Federal Inspection Commission was assigned to 
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prepare a review report on the functioning of WWF. Similarly, various task forces and 
commissions were set up. For instance Commission on Social Security 1993, the Task 
Force on Labour 1994, the Task Force on Social Security 1994, the Task Force on 
Pension Fund 1996, the Task Force on Labour Welfare Levies 2001 and the Task Force 
on Labour Welfare 2001 were set up. One can find a common thread in most of these 
deliberations.  Nearly all of these task forces offered recommendations for creation of one 
or two national institutions through amalgamation of existing ones for the provision of a 
comprehensive social security, old age pension and right based measures.  Also most of 
these task forces recommended these two institutions to be fully autonomous, transparent 
and with independent functioning. So far, the Ministry and the government demonstrated 
good deal of imperviousness and the dispensation has remained unaltered which tends to 
suggest that constitution of task forces were to deflect the criticism rather than seeking 
guidance for improvement.  
 
(iii)  Coverage and Adequacy 
It is generally recognised that pensions, social security and all the related welfare 
measures undertaken by various institutions under Ministry of Labour do not cover 
workers from the agriculture sector, the informal economy and those in the formal sector 
who are employed temporarily through contractors. On aggregate, therefore, these 
measures influence the lives of only 5 percent of the non-agricultural labour force. Given 
that most of the incremental employment during the past few years has been generated 
either in the informal sector or as the contractual labour in the formal sector, the coverage 
of these schemes has declined from 3-4 percent of the total employed labour force in 
1991 to an estimated 2 percent around year 2000.  Similarly, construction of housing and 
flats under WWF benefited during the past thirty years only to 44000 workers which 
accounts for around one percent of the industrial labour force in mining and 
manufacturing only. 
 
(iv)  Cost Effectiveness 
It has already been discussed in the previous section that the administrative cost of 
Social Security Institutions, Workers Welfare Fund and EOBI are very high compared to 
other similar organisations in the developing world.  Indeed, it may sound repetitious but 
one of the Commissions constituted to suggest for improvement in the implementation of 
the various measures very frankly viewed that all the measures and interventions made 
ostensibly to improve the workers welfare in fact are meant to enlarge the empire of the 
Ministry.  
 
(v)  Sustainability 
The problems of sustainability relating to EOBI have been discussed in detail in the 
foregoing.  At present, the benefit outgo ratio being larger than the incoming contribution 
alludes to the possibility that the EOBI under unchanging conditions may find itself 
incapacitated to cater to the needs of the workers after 20 years.  Similarly, there are 
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some indicators which suggest the emergence of the sustainability problem for the 
Workers Welfare Fund in near future. The major contributory stream originating from the 
unutilised funds collected under WPPF 1968 is likely to shrink in future, because the 
recent changes in the entitlement pattern wherein maximum wage ceiling has been raised 
from 3000 to 5000, the number of eligible employees will increase and left over funds for 
WWF may be curtailed substantially in future. 
 
B.  Transfers 
Zakat and private philanthropy constitute the two major streams of transfers 
presumed to be made to poor. The former prior to officialisation by Zia regime was part 
of the latter. It is difficult to quantify the net impact of the additionality of official Zakat. 
It may very well have substituted the former though a serious research study has yet to be 
conducted. 
Coverage of Zakat is quite limited. It benefited only 2 million people during the 
year 2001, in contrast to over 40 million poor. According to HIES 1998-99 data only 1.2 
percent households received Zakat.  Overall magnitude of the transfer under Zakat works 
out to 0.2 percent of GDP.  There appears to be ample room for targeting efficiency. In 
1996-97 only 29 percent of the direct transfers through Zakat were made to the bottom 
expenditure groups. Similarly HIES 1998-99 indicates that around one fifth of Zakat was 
pocketed by top three income groups. 
Lack of transparency and misgovernance have been reported to be substantial. 
Identification of eligible beneficiary by local zakat committee involves favouritism. 
As already discussed these concerns led to wholesale changes of the zakat committees 
in 2001, only to be replaced by another group of “honest” as identified by Army 
Monitoring Teams at district level. It may be added that any serious evaluation of the 
impact of zakat has never been made. Zakat also suffers from lack of financial 
stability. Payment of zakat has been made voluntary by the Supreme Court. In 
addition riba free economy under Islamisation is likely to change the entire collection 
and distribution of zakat. 
The magnitude of private transfer appears to have been exaggerated. For instance 
on the basis of responses of the households in HIES 1998-99 the value of gifts (private 
transfers) works out to Rs 8 or 9 billion. A survey of donors in the same year on the other 
hand suggests that Rs 41 billion have been spent under private philanthropy. Not much is 
known about the rich/poor share in the gifts.  HIES 1998-99 suggests that 11 percent of 
households received gifts during the year. But nearly half of the gifts were made to top 
three income groups, the share of poverty stricken households receiving the gifts would 
be around 5 to 6 percent. Based on 1991 PIHS, a study maintained that although around 
half of poor benefit from transfers, the system is ad hoc and depends on the discretion of 
donor.  Motives underlying private transfers have not been explored well in Pakistan. To 
the extent these transactions entail reciprocity it cannot be identified as philanthropy. 
Disempowerment, helplessness and ultimately subjugation of recipient while sustaining 
the structure of control can be a welfare loss too. 
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C.  Public Works 
Despite long history of the public works programme rarely any evaluative study has 
ever been undertaken to document the totality of impact of a programme for poverty 
alleviation or employment generation. This simply is reflective of the level of concern of 
policy-maker with respect to efficient use of resources. Incidentally it also exhibits the 
efforts to cover up the effects of politicisation and misgovernance.  Targeting efficiency 
of these programmes involves firstly to identify the poverty stricken areas. Geographic or 
regional incidence of poverty, however, based on HIES or PIHS produces inconsistent 
results. The provincial ranking using head count ratio fluctuates from year to year. Once 
project site is selected the participation of poor in construction work is ensured by 
keeping wages lower than the prevailing market rate.  Hardly any information pertaining 
to wage rates paid to different categories of workers to determine the applicability of the 
above cited self-targeting. That public works programmes in the past have been 
politicised with attendant misgovernance and sub-optimal use of resources appears to be 
a foregone conclusion. However, these programmes constitute one of the major 
interventions for rural development, employment generation and poverty alleviation. The 
challenge therefore is to strengthen the institutional structure and ensure better 
governance. In addition there is a need to allocate sufficient funds for maintenance of 
infrastructure to reap benefits of the past investments. Major initiatives in the 
construction of new facility, holding out potentials for kickback and constituency 
fortification have to be resisted.   
 
D.  Micro Credit 
Coverage of both PPAF and Khushali Bank at present is limited. Furthermore not 
much is known about the targeting efficiency. The criterion laid down by PPAF for 
selection of sister organisation can facilitate favouritism and be misused [Kemal (2002)]. 
In addition systematic procedures to evaluate the impact of these credit programmes have 
yet to be laid down.  Reliance on household surveys (HIES or PIHS) to infer changes in 
Head Count ratio will be of limited use to determine the efficacy of credit programme 
which could be one of many actors in the field. 
Admittedly release of credit constraints has positive effect on poor. The borrowed 
money is used for consumption smoothening as well as investment purposes. Among the 
poor the former influence predominates, as a consequence around 30 percent of the 
households in rural areas got classified as non-poor because their consumption was 
financed through borrowings. Evidence on capacity generation (in other words asset 
formation) in the case of poor is rare which is exclusively found in higher income groups 
[Malik (1999)].  Mounting indebtedness, however, appears to be a major result of these 
credit programmes. Recent World Bank Report (2002) described the borrowings by poor 
as “coping strategy” without scrutinising the sustainability of such a strategy.  A perusal 
of 1998-99 HIES for instance reveals that outstanding debts of three bottom income 
groups are equivalent to three times of their annual household income. Not only does this 
represent an inter-generational transfer of poverty but it also tends to question the very 
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assumptions under credit programmes which claim to attain asset formation of the poor. 
Clearly there is a need to package the credit provision along with other measures such as 
training, marketing and related aspects of their better use, otherwise the poor will be 
condemned to eternal dependency and destitution. 
 
E.  Social Action Programme (SAP) 
The fact that the objective of improving human development indicators of Pakistan, 
a major programme under SAP met with limited success particularly in case of primary 
education appears to be a foregone conclusion. What makes this outcome least palatable 
and disturbing is the fact that not only massive funding has been made to improve the 
situation but the government of Pakistan also enjoyed partnership with number of multi-
donor agencies in the design and implementation of SAP.  It appears that multiplicity of 
actors, the agenda being partly donor-driven, disproportionate emphasis on supply of 
inputs along with almost total neglect to the outcome (or output) as well as the failure to 
assess the demand of the population, which was supposed to be served, explain this poor 
performance. There are many reports and research efforts which document the reasons 
for failure of SAP.  Major findings are summarised below.  
 
(i)  Coverage 
SAP during its implementation from 1992 to 2002 has simply failed to achieve the 
targets which were fixed to begin with.  In other words the intended coverage could not 
be materialised.  As far as the effect on the poor is concerned, it may be noted that failure 
to enhance the participation of poor accounts for the major portion of failure of education 
programme under SAP. World Bank (2002) for instance reports that “for all the lower 
expenditure deciles primary GERs were lower in 1998-99 than in 1990-91. Improvement 
in enrolments in primary and secondary were experienced by highest expenditure deciles.  
Also, the drop-out rate recounts the same story wherein poverty status of a household is 
closely associated with high drop out rate. 
The incidence of diarrhea, as already discussed, is substantially higher in case of 
poverty stricken households alluding to the possibility of under-coverage of the poor. 
Similarly information on female health as indicated by pre- and post-natal care, and 
assistance at the time of delivery suggests wide differences in the consultation rates of 
rural and urban female as well as poor and non-poor. According to 1998-99 PIHS, pre- 
marital consultations in case of first quintile (per capita expenditure) in rural areas were 
reported to be 12 percent compared to 32 percent in the fifth quintile. Stark differentials 
are also observed in case of proportion of children with diarrhea having access to medical 
consultation as well as administration of ORS.  SAP not only failed as a programme to 
improve human development conditions but performed miserably in extending coverage 
to poverty stricken segment of society as SSN too. 
 
(ii)  Misgovernance and Politicisation of the Programme 
Emphasis laid down on the supply side in the design of SAP led to spurt in the 
infrastructural construction activity.  Thus, during the first phase of the SAP, the 
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establishment of primary schools, BHUs and other infrastructure pre-empted the major 
portion of the funds allocated for SAP.  These activities essentially were undertaken in a 
climate of political patronage which led to tremendous misuse in the deployment of 
resources. The phenomenon of ghost schools and non-existing BHUs along with massive 
absenteeism of the functionaries is very well-known which needs hardly any more 
discussion. One wonders why the designers of SAP which also includes the multi-
national donors failed to incorporate the possibilities of politicisation of the programme at 
the design stage because it was very well known and could have been anticipated.  One of 
the major reasons for scratching the Village-Aid Programme in 1962 to substitute it with 
the Rural Works Programme under the Basic Democracies was to sustain the hold of 
rural èlites needed for the continuation of the structure at the apex. Since then the 
politicisation of all the infrastructural activities continued uninterruptedly.  Therefore, 
one can safely conclude that all the construction activities under the guise of 
infrastructural developments or provision of schools and BHUs were likely to be misused 
by the politicians with the connivance of bureaucracy as well.  
That the failure of SAP is embedded in the political economy has been identified as 
a major conclusion.  Not only does this represent an Herculean challenge but efforts to 
improve the situation appear to have met with limited success as indicated by the 
experience under SAPP-II (Social Action Programme Project 1998-2002). Major World 
Bank Loans to Government of Pakistan since 1997 contain improvement in governance 
as a major clause of agreements. In case of Social Action Programme Project (SAPP-II) 
the agreement lays down adherence to objective criterion for appointments, site selection 
and procurement. The Third Party Validation however suggested substantial non-
compliance in this respect as reported below in Table 18. 
 
Table 18 
Percentage of Cases where Criteria were not Observed 
 1999 2000 2001 
Recruitment 5 38 36 
Procurement 46 50 64 
Absenteeism 60 70 69 
Site Selection 41 19 38 
 
The above is indicative of the fact that improving governance is not simply a matter 
of laying down criterion, rules and procedures only.  The clearance of World Bank for 
reimbursement despite non-compliance, however, remains esoteric. 
 
(iii)  Failure to Have a Sound Monitoring System 
The two monitoring agencies, MSU and SAP secretariat were put in place to 
monitor the performance of various outcome and process indicators as well as the 
delivery mechanism.  These agencies could not mature and become fully functional 
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presumably because of various reasons, a major one being the frequent multilateral and 
bilateral missions which disrupted the process of strengthening the focus of monitoring. 
A system of annual operational plans exists at provincial level with little evidence to 
suggest its institutionalisation. These are simply seen as a requirement of donors. 
Quarterly monitoring review by line departments has never been operationalised. 
 
(iv)  Inefficiency in Resource Use 
Deployment of resources in general has been sub-optimal owing to massive 
governance and management failure. In case of education for instance Mingat and 
Chuard (1996) reported that the unit cost of primary education in Pakistan is 40 percent 
higher than in comparable countries in spite of a higher pupil/teacher ratio. Similarly high 
dropout and repetition rates imply massive wastage of resources.  
 
F.  SSN—Adequacy and Limitation 
Not only are the SSN insufficient but suffer from variety of problems associated 
with weak and corrupt institutional setup as already discussed. The financing gaps and 
low level of allocation of resources to alleviate poverty further compounded the situation. 
The foregoing is indicative of utter inadequacy of the SSN to address the issues related to 
poverty alleviation.  This is manifest from the crude estimates of income equivalence of 
SSN, low and declining level of poverty related expenditure and Pakistan’s position 
among the SAARC countries, as discussed below. 
 
(i)  Income Equivalence of Transfers 
It is a complex task to estimate the income equivalence of the transfers entailed by 
SSN which are thinly spread over number of activities and defy quantification of the 
impact on poor. Governance issues further complicate the exercise because it is simply 
not clear how much of the funds were siphoned off by the influence wielders or gate 
keepers.  Still SPDC (1999) made an attempt to work out the income equivalence of 
transfers.  According to the estimates of this study based on crude as well as bold 
assumptions, less than 1 percent of GDP was the totality of transfers provided through 
Zakat, private philanthropy and credit measures. It may be added some researchers have 
estimated that around 6.8 percent of GDP has to be transferred to poor if the objective of 
poverty alleviation is to be achieved.   
 
(ii)  Poverty-related Expenditure 
It will be instructive to assess the governmental commitment to alleviate poverty by 
using the level of resources deployed.  During the 1990s the fiscal gap appeared to have 
been bridged through drastic curtailment in the PSDP. A particular focus on poverty-
related national expenditure suggests a cut from 4.8 percent of the GDP in 1987-88 to 3.8 
percent in the year 2000-01. The fact that the allocation to mega projects and the 
personnel expenditure of government was protected underscores the priority of the 
government attached to poverty alleviation. That Pakistan is lagging behind in the 
provision of social protection is clearly manifest from Table 19 below. 
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Table 19 
Social Protection in SAARC Countries 
 Access to Health Services 
Child Immunisation % 
Children Less than 12 
Months 
 
Measles DPT 
 % Births 
Attended by 
Skilled Health 
Staff 
% Pensioner 
Population 
Older than 
64 Years 
Total Social 
Security 
Expenditure  
% of GDP 
Bangladesh 97 98 8 N.A N.A. 
India 81 90 35 – 1.8 (1990) 
Nepal 85 78 9 – – 
Pakistan 74 74 18 3.29 1.1 (1985) 
Sri Lanka 94 97 94 15.70 4.7 (1990) 
Source: World Labour Report (2000). Income Security and Social Protection with Changing World. I.L.O 
Geneva. 
 
The table is reflective of the fact that Pakistan compared to the rest of SAARC 
countries pays little attention to the extension of social security measures to its citizens 
wherein the poor emerge to be worst sufferers. The above simply is reflective of 
inadequacy of SSN to alleviate poverty. 
 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
An inordinately high level of poverty, negligible social safety measures and 
subdued economic performance are the inter-related major distinguishing features of 
Pakistan. Worse still, options with policy-makers to address these issues appear to be 
limited because of the choice of a specific growth strategy conditioned by stabilisation 
and structural adjustment and globalisation programmes which foreclose the repeat of the 
past performance for poverty alleviation, though some of those measures undertaken in 
the past were unsustainable and had temporary respite to begin with.  Poverty situation 
during the past appears to have been favourably influenced by GDP growth, labour 
market tightness occasioned by emigration as well as domestic employment promotion 
and inflow of remittance which enhanced effective demand in the economy. 
Given that the objectives of stabilisation more or less have been achieved, the 
foreign exchange reserves have shot up and remittances inflow has rebounded one should 
hope for improvement in the lives of poor. But this will depend upon a variety of 
complex factors.  Reactivation of growth requires rise in investment particularly in the 
private sector which so far has not responded well even to lowering of interest rate. 
Failure of private investment to register a rise could be attributed to a number of factors 
including low level of PSDP. It is in this context that the policy-makers may ascertain the 
nature of relationship between PSDP and private investment. Upto a certain level it could 
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be symbiotic, thus a massive increase in PSDP appears imperative to reactivate growth. 
Given the newly acquired fiscal space despite the commitment that budget deficit must be 
contained within limits agreed with IMF it should be feasible to enhance PSDP.  
High GDP growth must occur in the labour intensive sectors to generate employment 
which often acts as conduit for growth to influence poor.  What should not be glossed over 
is the fact that a wedge has been driven between employment generation and poverty 
alleviation by low and declining wages in informal and other labour intensive sectors of the 
economy.  Under the existing paradigm, labour is just a factor of production rather than 
social partner, and hence has to be priced by supply and demand forces.  This has generated 
a phenomenon of rapid growth of working poor because the low wages fail to extricate the 
workers from poverty.  Minimum wage legislation of 2001 was unique in the history of this 
country wherein rise in cost of living was not fully adjusted while fixing the minimum 
wages.  At the same time, there is an urgent need to improve the productivity levels of 
these in the informal sector, so that they are pulled out of poverty.  
Recent rise in remittance may not have the same effect on growth and poverty 
alleviation as was the case in 1980s. During the past the unskilled and semiskilled 
emigrants in the Middle East sent the remittances which were mostly spent on 
consumption and house construction activities. The current upsurge in the officially 
recorded inflow of remittances may be reflecting to some extent the substitution of 
erstwhile Havala transfer by banking channels thereby exaggerating the additionality of 
remittances inflow.  Furthermore, emigrants in the Western countries which underwent 
an attitudinal change after 9-11 besides intensified scrutiny of Havala and Transfers also 
acted as a stimulant in this context. Most of these remittances emanating from West, 
which account for substantial portion of total, appear to have gone into real estate, hence 
imparting the depressed economy of Pakistan some features of a bubble economy.  
Irrespective of the level of PSDP, the efficient deployment of resources has to be 
guaranteed. The governance structure ranging from resource allocation to implementation 
has to be improved. It will be premature to speculate about the impact of the efforts made 
to improve governance in the recent past, however, a clean departure from the past would 
necessitate that agents of change will have to become also the subject of change. Of 
course this constitutes a tall order. 
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Appendices 
Appendix Table 1 
Zakat Receipts 
(Rs  Million) 
  Years 
Total 
Deduction at 
Source 
Zakat 
Voluntarily 
Paid 
Other 
Receipts 
Total 
Zakat 
Total 
Zakat/GDP 
(%) 
1980-81 844.25 1.6 – 845.9 0.31 
1981-82 902.4 1.6 – 904.0 0.28 
1982-83 1027.0 1.0 – 1028.0 0.28 
1983-84 1490.0 1.0 – 1491.0 0.36 
1984-85 1334.8 1.8 – 1336.6 0.29 
1985-86 1521.0 1.7 – 1522.7 0.30 
1986-87 1658.9 1.4 – 1660.3 0.30 
1987-88 2069.5 2.4 0.3 2072.2 0.33 
1988-89 2279.4 3.5 1.8 2284.7 0.32 
1989-90 2573.2 3.5 0.8 2577.6 0.34 
1990-91 2792.0 5.6 0.6 2798.2 0.31 
1991-92 2770.3 8.3 0.2 2778.8 0.26 
1992-93 2658.4 7.7 1.7 2667.8 0.22 
1993-94 2844.4 7.4 1804.1 4655.9 0.33 
1994-95 3073.2 9.9 47.5 3130.6      0.18 
1995-96 3260.6 12.5 208.1 3481.2 0.18 
1996-97 3805.5 13.0 78.4 3896.6 0.17 
1997-98 4088.1 11.2 19.5 4118.8 0.16 
1998-99 4061.2 16.0 2434.8 6512.0 0.23 
1999-2000 4309.0 18.0 85.0 4411.0 0.15 
2000-01 4276.0 11.0 88.0 4376.0 0.14 
Source: State Bank of Pakistan (various issues) Annual Report. 
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Appendix Table 2 
Net Primary Enrolment Rates in Pakistan and Provinces 
Total Boys Girls  
1991 1996 1997 1999 1991 1996 1997 1999 1991 1996 1997 1999 
Pakistan 
  Total 46 44 42 42 53 49 46 47 38 38 37 37 
  Rural 41 39 37 37 50 47 43 43 31 31 30 30 
  Urban 59 55 55 57 61 56 56 58 57 55 55 56 
Punjab 
  Total 53 45 42 44 59 50 45 47 46 39 39 40 
  Rural 47 42 38 40 56 49 42 44 38 34 32 35 
  Urban 67 55 55 56 69 55 54 54 65 55 56 57 
Sindh 
  Total 39 45 45 41 45 50 51 47 33 39 39 35 
  Rural 32 35 37 29 41 45 46 37 21 24 28 21 
  Urban 51 57 57 60 51 58 58 63 50 57 56 57 
NWFP 
  Total 38 35 37 39 49 42 42 47 27 28 32 30 
  Rural 36 32 35 37 47 40 40 45 25 24 30 27 
  Urban 47 51 50 54 59 52 55 59 39 50 45 49 
Balochistan 
  Total 27 45 36 36 37 51 46 44 18 39 27 28 
  Rural 26 44 34 34 37 49 42 42 18 39 24 25 
  Urban 32 49 50 54 40 57 53 58 24 41 47 51 
Source:  Social Action Programme-SAPPII Mid-Term Review: Performance indicators 1991-99, Oxford 
Policy Management. 
   Note:  T=Both Sexes; B=Boys; G-Girls. 
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